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ABSTRACT
TOBACCO AND ITS ROLE IN THE LIFE OF THE CONFEDERACY
D . T. Smith 
Old Dominion University, 1993 
Director: Dr. Harold S. Wilson
This study examines the role that tobacco played in 
influencing Confederate policy during the American Civil 
War. Surprisingly, very little research has been done on 
this subject; historians have virtually ignored the 
influence of tobacco upon Southern economic interests 
between 1850 and 1870.
The southern tobacco-producing states grew 439,183,561 
pounds of raw tobacco in 1860. Southern manufactured 
tobacco was worth $21,820,535 in 1860, and along with other 
agricultural products, especially cotton, played an 
important economic, political, and diplomatic role in the 
life of the Confederacy. The tobacco industry represented a 
very strong interest group in the Upper South during the 
Civil War.
After the war, tobacco emerged again as the principal 
cash crop of the Upper South, as consumption became a 
national pastime.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN TOBACCO INDUSTRY
From the days of John Rolfe and the fledgling English 
colony at Jamestown until the 1850s, tobacco was a major 
agricultural interest to Virginia, the South, and of course, 
the nation. Even though the South's cotton yield was much 
more economically profitable over the years, the "older 
staple continued to be the principal money crop for a large 
part of the Upper South. Tobacco in certain areas was 
hardly less important than cotton in the Gulf states."1 
Cotton was indeed the cornerstone of "King Cotton" 
diplomacy;2 cotton was at the hub of social, commercial, 
political, and diplomatic activity in the South during the
‘Joseph C. Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1938), viii.
2In layman's terms, "King Cotton" diplomacy refers to 
the time-honored principle which claims that the 
agricultural commodity of cotton was all-important to the 
political, economic, and diplomatic interests of the 
Confederate States of America. The Confederacy believed 
that England and France would politically recognize and 
militarily support the Confederate States of America in its 
struggle against the United States in exchange for a steady 
supply of cotton.
1
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2Confederate era.3
This study, however, will examine the primary role that 
tobacco played in the institutions of the South from 1850 to 
1870. Several important volumes have been written about 
"King Cotton" culture and diplomacy, but very little has 
been said about the primacy of tobacco to the economic and 
political interests of the Confederacy.4
3Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy—Foreign 
Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1931). Owsley's King Cotton 
Diplomacy is considered to be the authoritative study of 
Confederate foreign diplomacy, and the crucial role that 
cotton played therein.
4Joseph C. Robert's The Tobacco Kingdom is recognized 
as a thorough examination of tobacco cultivation from its 
inception at Jamestown to the modern manufacturing and 
marketing strategies of the twentieth century. The only 
glaring omission of Robert's highly-acclaimed effort is the 
absence of documentation of the Confederate tobacco industry 
during the war. Robert does a commendable job in his 
description of the antebellum and postbellum tobacco 
industries; his volume, however, fails to address 
significant existing documentation which reinforces the 
validity of the concept of "King Tobacco." B.W. Arnold's 
History of the Tobacco Industry in Virginia from 1860-1894 
relies heavily upon statistical data gleaned from the 
agricultural and manufacturing schedules of the seventh, 
eighth, ninth, and tenth census reports. Arnold's study is 
very much data-based and provides the reader with a fairly 
well-rounded quantitative study of the tobacco industry 
following the Reconstruction. His work, however, is also 
incomplete as a result of his failure to address important 
issues and developments that pertain to the war years.
Nannie Mae Tilley's The Bright Tobacco Industry, 1860-1929 
is accepted as the definitive inspection of the cultivation, 
curing, and manufacture of bright tobacco in Virginia and 
North Carolina. Tilley's highly-regarded work is trade- 
oriented, however, and is without any historical 
documentation of the tobacco industry as it existed during 
the Civil War. Several articles have been published on this 
subject. Bingham Duncan's "Franco-American tobacco 
diplomacy" (Maryland Historical Magazine, vol. 51) is an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3The tobacco planters and manufacturers of Virginia and 
North Carolina provided the nation as well as the world with 
a product unsurpassed in terms of economic demand and 
profit. Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri grew significant 
quantities of tobacco prior to the Civil War; in 1860, 
Kentucky grew 108,126,840 pounds, Tennessee 43,448,097 
pounds, and Missouri 25,086,196 pounds.5 The largest 
quantities and best quality of tobacco that was grown in the 
United States grew in the tobacco heartland of the future 
Confederate States of America: Virginia and North
Carolina.6
As of 1850, the cities of Richmond, Lynchburg,
Danville, and Petersburg were established as the premier 
tobacco manufacturing centers in the Old South.7 The
excellent examination of the diplomatic role that tobacco 
played in American foreign policy before the war. W.F. 
Spencer's "French Tobacco in Richmond" (Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography, vol. 71), captures the essence of the 
controversy which described the Confederacy's attempt to 
transport French-owned tobacco from Richmond to France 
through the Federal naval blockade in 1863-1864. Frank L. 
Olmstead's "Tobacco Tax of 1863 to 1864" (Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, vol. 5), focuses on the taxation policies of 
the Federal government on tobacco in 1863 and 1864.
5U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1863). Also
see Appendix 12 on page 129.
Virginia and North Carolina produced a crop of 
roughly 155,000,000 pounds that was valued at nearly 
$15,000,000 in 1860.
7B.W. Arnold, History of the Tobacco Trade in Virginia 
from 1860-1894 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), 58.
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nationally and internationally renowned Virginia tobacco 
leaf, lump, and twist was grown, processed, manufactured, 
and shipped out from this highly-prized agricultural region 
by wealthy and influential planters, merchants, and 
manufacturers.8
Tobacconists such as James Thomas, Jr., of Richmond,
William T. Sutherlin of Danville, David Dunlop of
Petersburg, and Augustine Leftwich of Lynchburg, were among
the wealthiest and most successful manufacturers of their
respective cities during the 1850s. In 1850 the Thomas
tobacco factory, one of the largest in Richmond with ninety
hands in both slave laborers and hired operatives, made
600,000 pounds of chewing tobacco valued at $120,000.
Thomas's business practically doubled between 1850 and 1860.
At the latter date it employed 150 hands—more than any other
Richmond factory-and made 1,100,000 pounds of chewing
tobacco valued at $225,000.9 The breadth and scope of
Sutherlin's tobacco business mirrored that of his
counterpart in Richmond.
By 1850, Sutherlin's labor force numbered forty, and 
he manufactured tobacco worth $55,000. In less than 
10 years, his factory, clearly the most extensive in 
all Pittsylvania County, employed seventy-five hands 
and produced 435,000 pounds of the manufactured 
product valued at $97,732. Sutherlin's slave
8Please see Appendix 1 on page 113 for figures which 
reflect the capital worth of prominent tobacconists of 
Virginia during the antebellum period.
9Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 195.
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5ownership increased from twenty-seven to forty 
between 1850 and I860.10
Dunlop's tobacco enterprises "specialized in the export
trade and produced 400 tons of lump and twist tobacco
annually; he employed between 110 and 300 hands each year in
the decade of 1850.1,11 Manufactured tobacco was commonly
referred to as lump or chewing tobacco. "Twist" tobacco was
a variety of chew which was produced by twisting several
kinds of tobacco together.
Thomas, Sutherlin, Dunlop and Leftwich were not the 
only major influential tobacconists of Richmond, Lynchburg, 
Danville, and Petersburg. J.H. Grant and William Barrett 
were also very wealthy and successful tobacco manufacturers 
in Richmond; they were worth $350,000 and $100,000, 
respectively, in 1850. Bird L. Ferrell and his son Peter W. 
Ferrell worked in conjunction with Sutherlin's enterprises 
in Danville. J.W. Holland also had a successful tobacco 
factory in Danville. W.B.B. Walker and Doctors Madison 
Pendleton and William J. Pendleton were active in the 
tobacco trade in northern Louisa County, just north of
10Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 179-80; U.S. Census, 
1850: Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia; U.S. Census, 1860: 
Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia.
"Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 186; U.S. Census, 1850: 
Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia; U.S. Census, 1860: 
Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia.
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6Richmond.12 The biographical profile of James Thomas, Jr., 
reflects the general background of the successful antebellum 
tobacco manufacturer. Thomas was a middle-aged (born in 
Caroline County, Virginia, 1806) entrepreneur whose tobacco 
career began in 1829, when he obtained the local agency to 
buy tobacco for the French government. By the 1850s, 
Thomas's manufactured tobacco was well-known nationally as 
well as internationally, putting him at the front of the 
southern tobacco industry.13
Hundreds of tobacco merchants, agents, and traders 
patronized the major tobacco manufacturers of the Richmond 
vicinity; many tobacconists of the North, the Deep South, 
and the West were faithful customers of Virginia's 
antebellum tobacco industry.14 Tobacco grown and processed 
in Virginia possessed a great demand overseas and was 
exported to such far-flung places as Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, Holland, and Australia.15
The antebellum tobacco trade of the 1850s was
12Refer to Appendices 5-14 to see manufacturing 
schedules from the census of 1850 and 1860 in order to view 
the quantity and value of tobacco manufactured by 
tobacconists in Richmond, Lynchburg, and Danville during the 
antebellum period.
13Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 265-68.
14The names and home cities of many antebellum 
tobacconists are listed on page 115 of Appendix 2.
15The names and home cities of thirteen foreign 
tobacconists are listed on page 117 of Appendix 3.
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influenced by events such as the California gold rush of the 
early 1850s and the secession of South Carolina on 20 
December 1860.
A San Francisco tobacconist, J.H. Coghill, described 
the California tobacco trade in 1852 as "one of the 
strangest markets in the world."16 Virginia tobacconist 
James Thomas, Jr. established a virtual monopoly on the 
California tobacco market in the early 1850s as a result of 
his "style of packing and putting it up in bright, new 
fancy-looking boxes."17 The lure of gold attracted a steady 
influx of tobacco-consuming miners to California; "business 
was good, as every steamer brought its full complement of 
passengers, besides the thousands who arrived in sailing 
vessels"18 on a regular basis. Chewing and smoking tobacco 
were prized by San Francisco's thousands of miners.
The shipments of Virginia tobacco to points west of 
the Mississippi River involved both rail and river 
transportation; in winter months ice, wind, and snow clogged 
the thoroughfare of both venues.19 Frequently, tobacco was
16J .H . Coghill to James Thomas, Jr., San Francisco, 13 
January 1852, James Thomas, Jr. Papers (hereafter cited as 
Thomas Papers), Special Collections, Perkins Library, Duke 
University.
17J.H. Coghill to James Thomas, Jr., San Francisco, 5 
May 1859, ibid.
:8Ibid.
I9Heald, Bucknor and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 
Philadelphia, 21 January 1852, ibid.
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8shipped by rail from Richmond to Baltimore to Pittsburgh; 
the westbound cargo was then moved through Cincinnati and 
Louisville upon the Ohio River to St. Louis. The article 
was transported south on the Mississippi from St. Louis 
through Memphis to the deep-water port of New Orleans, where 
it was loaded upon vessels for its final destination, San 
Francisco, California.20 Tobacco-laden vessels then 
completed the long, arduous journey to California by sailing 
around Cape Horn of South America to San Francisco. Tobacco 
manufacturers were cautioned to "put up" their tobacco 
carefully in order to protect the valuable leaf from molding 
while it endured the long eight-month journey from Richmond 
to San Francisco.21
Virginia's 209 tobacco factories manufactured 
$5,157,652 worth of tobacco from a total crop of 56,803,227 
pounds in 1850, using the labor of 4,802 male and 477 female 
factory operatives. Seven tobacco factories in Richmond 
manufactured at least $100,000 worth of tobacco in 1850. By 
1860, 261 of the South's 409 tobacco factories were located 
in Virginia. Virginia's tobacco crop of 1860 was 
123,968,312 pounds, with a labor force of 11,321 males and 
2,300 females producing a manufactured tobacco product
20James Wilson to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 13 May 
1852, ibid.
21Charles M. Connolly to James Thomas, Jr., New York,
28 January 1852, ibid.
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9valued at $12,236,683. Eighteen factories in Richmond 
produced at least $100,000 worth of tobacco in I860.22
Complaints as well as compliments were included in 
letters written by regional tobacconists to the planters and 
manufacturers of the Richmond area. Occasionally, Southern 
tobacco agents accused Virginia manufacturers of selling 
tobacco to them at prices higher than the rates charged to 
their Northern counterparts.23 Some dealers even claimed 
that tobacco supposedly produced in Virginia was actually 
"counterfeit";24 others simply complained that "the price was 
too high"25 for their particular interests. On the other 
hand, many Northern, Southern, or Western tobacco dealers 
expressed delight: "We are glad to see this tobacco coming
along, as we like to have some of it always on hand to 
supply all the calls there may be for it."26
By the mid-1850s, a myriad of marketing costs were 
saddled upon both producers and manufacturers alike.
Profits from sales to domestic and foreign agents, dealers,
22U .S. Census, 1860; see Appendices 5-14.
^J.C. Glenn to James Thomas, Jr., New Orleans, 5 May 
1852, Thomas Papers.
24Fears and Putnam to J.C. Glenn and Co., Jackson, 
Miss., 29 April 1852, ibid.
^Robert T. Dade to James Thomas, Jr., Mobile, 10 June 
1854, ibid.
26Fisher and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 16 
December 1859, ibid.
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and speculators were reduced as a result of freight, labor, 
storage, and cartage charges. The article had to be insured 
against fire and loss at sea; in addition, the manufacturer 
was expected to pay for the weighing, sampling, and 
advertising of his tobacco.27 Commissions of anywhere from 
three to seven percent, tolls, and cooperage rounded off the 
expenses which were absorbed by the producer.28
Many changes in the Southern tobacco trade of the 
mid-1850s affected tobacconists. As early as 1854, "bright- 
yellow" tobacco became a highly desirable commodity both 
domestically and abroad; this variety of tobacco grew 
primarily in Pittsylvania County, Virginia and Caswell 
County, North Carolina. It was prized for its value as a 
smoking tobacco, and as a brightly colored wrapper for 
manufactured chewing tobacco.29 The period also marked the 
opening of new foreign markets. As early as 1852, tobacco 
produced in Richmond found its way into the Australian ports 
of Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney via Richmond, Norfolk, 
Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and London. 
Australian firms such as McPherson and Company, Green,
^Charles M. Connolly to James Thomas, Jr., New York, 9 
June 1860, ibid.
28Deane and Browne and Co. to W.B.B. Walker, Richmond, 
17 May 1854, Madison and William J. Pendleton Papers 
(hereafter cited as Pendleton Papers), Special Collections, 
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
29E.G . Collier to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 30 June 
1854, Thomas Papers.
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Heath, and Allen, Mailler, Lord, and Quereau, and Fisher, 
Ricards and Company, all did business with James Thomas, Jr. 
of Richmond, and frequently employed intermediary agents 
based in New York City.30 Other trends in the Southern 
antebellum tobacco industry included agricultural reform.
The use of guano as a rich source of fertilizer for the 
prized plant increased.31 Extra care was given to the drying 
of the leaf and tobacco marketing became more specialized.32 
Chewing and smoking tobacco were distinguished by whether 
they were bright or dark tobacco.33
In the late 1850s, many Richmond-based tobacconists 
were confident that the industry was “getting better every 
day."34 Many traders saw the "market as being active, and 
with all good lump and leaf in dry order selling readily at 
full prices,"35 with trade in Virginia tobacco exceptionally
30W.H. Wilkinson to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 18 May 
1852, ibid.
31J.H. Motley to W.B.B. Walker, Richmond, 2 May 1855, 
Pendleton Papers.
32Morton Armstead to W.B.B. Walker, Richmond, 28 March 
1857, ibid.
33Buskirk and Dana to William T. Sutherlin, Portsmouth, 
Va., 15 July 1858, William T. Sutherlin Papers (hereafter 
cited as Sutherlin Papers), Special Collections, Perkins 
Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
MBird L. Ferrell to William T. Sutherlin, Richmond, 11 
October 1858, ibid.
35Morton Armstead to William B.B. Walker, Richmond, 2 3 
February 1857, Thomas Papers.
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brisk in Northern cities as well as in London and 
Liverpool.36
But problems did surface. Some northern suppliers 
often ran out. One New York tobacconist, J.L.S. Pendleton, 
lashed out at his Danville-based supplier: "What are you
thinking about? We could have sold quite a lot today. Wake 
up and send us our order."37 German firms such as D.H.
Watjen Company, Boninger, Kramer and Company, and H.H. Meier 
were enthusiastic customers of Richmond tobacco.38 Foreign 
firms, such as these Bremen concerns, frequently requested 
that original inspection samples of tobacco be forwarded 
from Virginia prior to the actual shipment in order that the 
article might be sold before its arrival.39
These indications of prosperity quietly vanished as 
sectional differences over the slavery question gained 
public attention. After the John Brown raid in 1859, 
serious concerns and fears troubled Northern and Southern 
businessmen alike. As the North and South became 
increasingly polarized and hostile to one another, many
36John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 
1 December 1859, ibid.
37J.L.S. Pendleton to J.M. Sutherlin, New York, 23 July
1859, Sutherlin Papers.
38D.H. Watjen to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 3 January
1860, Thomas Papers; H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas,
Jr., Bremen, 2 January 1860, ibid.
39H.H. Meier and Co., to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 2 
January 1860, ibid.
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Northern and Southern tobacconists aired their concerns in
business correspondence. The prospects for the future
seemed grim to some! In early 1860, Bucknor and McCammon of
Philadelphia wrote to James Thomas, Jr. of Richmond on 2
January, "We appear to be naturally sliding into civil war.
Still we hope the Great Orderer of events will prevent such
a calamity, and keep us a great and united people."40
Speculation ran rampant throughout the nation that the
country might be divided by secession. A Boston tobacconist
wrote Thomas on 15 November 1860, and expressed his concern
for the well-being of the tobacco trade and the nation,
The present position of affairs certainly warrants 
grave apprehensions as to the future. Though 
hundred here believe or propose to believe, that all 
this excitement will end in nothing, we must say we 
have (and many of our friends have) very serious 
fears as to the results. If the South does actually 
secede there is no telling the amount of injury that 
will result to all parts of the country. . . . While 
bringing our business matters under as "close sail" 
as possible and preparing for the future, we still 
hope the threatened storm may blow over resulting in 
no lasting damage to any part of the country. We 
had no intention when we began this letter of 
touching at all upon this subject—but your [those of 
James Thomas, Jr.] remarks naturally led us to speak 
of it and emboldened us to express our opinion. It 
is a matter that we rarely allow ourselves to 
introduce into a business letter.41
Tension and uncertainty gripped tobacconists in 
regions north, south, and west of Richmond. On 1 December
40Bucknor and McCammon to James Thomas, Jr. , 
Philadelphia, 2 January 1860, ibid.
41J.H. and S.G. Thayer to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 15 
November 1860, ibid.
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1860, John Ward, a Louisville tobacconist and a steady 
customer of James Thomas, Jr., declared that "everything has 
come to a deadlock and what is to be the result of our 
trouble is known only to God."42 Another western tobacco 
dealer, A.J. Seemullen of St. Louis, remarked to Thomas that 
"the political troubles at the South have put a sudden and 
unfortunate stop to business in our community, and for a 
month past there has been literally nothing doing here."43 
By mid-December of 1860, it became increasingly clear that 
South Carolina would indeed secede from the Union. The 
integrity of the Southern tobacco trade rested with the 
fortunes of the nation. J.B. Carroll, a tobacco dealer from 
Portland, Maine noted that "I hope things work out soon and 
the Union be saved but fear from present appearances South 
Carolina will secede and the government wil 1 iX5c force to 
preserve the Union."44 While visiting Cincinnati, Thomas C. 
Williams, a Richmond-based tobacconist and a confidante of 
James Thomas, Jr., observed that "an immense trade and 
prosperous times would have been had this fall and spring 
but for the political troubles which are heaped upon the
42John Ward to James Thomas, Jr., Louisville, 1 
December 1860, ibid.
43A.J. Seemullen to James Thomas, Jr., St. Louis, 3 
December 1860, ibid.
^J.B. Carroll to James Thomas, Jr., Portland, 3 
December 1860, ibid.
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Palmetto state out here."45 Just days prior to the secession 
of South Carolina, Adams Frost, a prominent tobacco dealer 
in Charleston, predicted that "we expect to go out of the 
Union this week and then we can't say what will be the 
course of things."46
South Carolina's fateful decision to secede from the 
Union on 20 December 1860 disrupted the South's antebellum 
tobacco industry. A New Orleans firm complained that 
"business is still very much depressed and though we 
anticipate better sales, yet one can as yet see no end to 
the political and financial troubles."47 Southern 
preoccupation with the political and economic turmoil of the 
times was reflected accurately by Charleston tobacconist 
Adams Frost, who wrote James Thomas, Jr., on 24 December 
1860 that:
though we have seceded, we have not yet stopped 
communication altogether with the rest of the world.
We send letters by mail as usual—whether this will 
be stopped in a day or two, and also the Customs 
House, depends upon a resolution of the Convention 
now in session, who are considering the matter.48
The arrival of 1861 did nothing to dispel the dark
45T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Cincinnati, 5 
December 1860, ibid.
^Adams Frost to James Thomas, Jr., Charleston, 17 
December 1860, ibid.
47Van Benthuysen and Crofton to James Thomas, Jr., New 
Orleans, 25 December 1860, ibid.
48Adams Frost to James Thomas, Jr., Charleston, 24 
December 1860, ibid.
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foreboding which gripped Northern and Southern tobacconists 
on the subjects of trade and war. J.A. and T.A. Patterson 
of New York expressed their fear that "we can not see 
through present political troubles. Mr. Seward thinks he 
can. We confess all looks dark to us."49 Bucknor, McCammon, 
and Co. of Philadelphia feared much "on account of our 
political troubles and the disastrous effects on the 
industry and the trade of the country."50 Fear was sometimes 
offset by the cautious hope that "an early settlement of 
existing political troubles and a restoration of confidence 
would restore an active and satisfactory tobacco business."51 
Stress and uncertainty characterized the American tobacco 
trade at this time. However, Northern firms were initially 
hesitant to focus hostility on southern manufacturers such 
as James Thomas, Jr. or William T. Sutherlin. Northern 
tobacco dealers clung to the hope that a swift conclusion to 
the country's political differences would once again restore 
order to the tobacco trade between northern and southern 
states.
When war became more imminent as a result of the 
secession of the remaining six states of the Deep South, the
49J .A . and T.A. Patterson to James Thomas, Jr., New 
York, 1 February 1861, ibid.
50Bucknor and McCammon to James Thomas, Jr., 
Philadelphia, 7 January 1861, ibid.
5IWilliam H. Price to James Thomas, Jr., New York, 7 
January 1861, ibid.
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Virginia tobacco market was "entirely at a stand."52 Trade 
with Northern and foreign firms became paralyzed. A.J. 
Seemullen of St. Louis remarked that "no business has been 
done here worthy of note since Lincoln's election."53 One 
Chicago concern simply severed its ties to Virginia 
manufacturers because "the present prospects before us make 
us feel disinclined to give any orders."54 A dealer from 
Philadelphia lamented that "the spring tobacco trade will 
not be much more than one half that of last year."55 Some 
tobacco speculators in the North believed that northern 
tobacco consumers might not buy tobacco manufactured in the 
South as a result of the secession of the states of the Deep 
South. Northern dealers refused to take the economic risk 
of importing southern tobacco until they were certain that 
it could be sold without loss to consumers. Some British 
and Australian tobacco interests suggested that Virginia 
heal up the sectional difficulties of the nation56 so that 
mutually profitable trade could once again resume. Tobacco
52Robert Edwards to James Thomas, Jr., Liverpool, 15 
February 1861, ibid.
53A.J. Seemullen to James Thomas, Jr., St. Louis, 22 
February 1861, ibid.
^G. Frankenthal and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 26 
February 1861, ibid.
55Motzer and Boehm to James Thomas, Jr., Philadelphia,
1 April 1861, ibid.
56Greene, Heath, and Allen to James Thomas, Jr., San 
Francisco, 28 February 1861, ibid.
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commerce upon the high seas was also threatened by the 
prospect of a Federal naval blockade upon the ports of the 
newly-created Confederate States of America. Tobacco 
manufacturers in the Richmond vicinity anticipated with 
apprehension a blockade and its influence upon British and 
Confederate ships.57 With spring in full bloom in the South, 
the divided nation faced civil war. The destiny of the 
Confederacy, and its tobacco industry, lay in the hands of 
those forces which collided at Fort Sumter on 12 April 1861.
On the eve of the Civil War, tobacco in the South 
ranked second in the number of hands employed, third in 
value of product, and fourth in capital investment when 
compared to three other major Southern staples: lumber,
grain, and cotton.58 Southern tobacco planters enjoyed 
bumper crop yields in the years 1859 and 1860; in 1859, 
tobacco was second in economic importance only to cotton 
($21,000,000 to $161,000,000).59 In 1859, the entire 
continent of Europe imported 254,004,557 pounds of tobacco 
from around the world. Europe's two largest tobacco 
consumers, Great Britain and France, gained $26,267,160 and 
$36,000,000 respectively from duties placed upon tobacco
57J.T. Doswell to James Thomas, Jr., New Orleans, 27 
February 1861, ibid.
58Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, viii.
59U .S. Congress, House of Representatives, Tobacco 
Trade, 36th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. Report no. 667, 25 June 
1860, 5.
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imported from the United States in 1859 alone.60 British 
duties placed on American tobacco were three shillings plus 
five percent per pound of leaf tobacco and nine shillings 
plus five percent per pound of manufactured tobacco. French 
duties fluctuated from $1.86 to $2.57 per kilogram of 
tobacco leaf in 1859.61 In 1860, Virginia and North Carolina 
tobacco yields netted 123,968,312 pounds and 32,853,250 
pounds, respectively, of the valuable leaf; the Commonwealth 
of Virginia grew sixteen million pounds of tobacco more than 
its nearest competitor, the Commonwealth of Kentucky.62
Before the war, Britain and France were the largest 
foreign consumers of Southern tobacco; in 1860, Great 
Britain alone consumed sixty million pounds of tobacco, with 
more than half of this amount being imported from the United 
States. Three-fourths to four-fifths of all tobacco 
consumed in France in 1860 also originated in the United 
States. Later, some speculators in the foreign tobacco 
trade predicted that the French Emperor Louis Napoleon would 
break the blockade in order to insure himself a reliable and 
continuous supply of morale-sustaining tobacco for his 
legion of 600,000 soldiers.63
“Ibid.
6IIbid.
62Arnold, History of the Tobacco Trade, 19.
63New York Times, 2 October 1861, editorial.
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The importance of the Old Dominion to the Southern 
tobacco industry preceded its primacy as the political 
nucleus of the Confederacy, with Richmond, Petersburg, 
Danville, and Lynchburg being the most important Confederate 
tobacco production centers at the outbreak of war.64 
Richmond "was clearly the tobacco manufacturing center of 
the nation, if not the world. No city, north, south or west 
equalled Richmond in the value of its product."65
Virginia tobacco (that which was grown in Virginia 
and North Carolina) was superior to any grown elsewhere in 
the country because of reasons ranging from the soil 
composition and climate of the region to superior 
manufacturing techniques. Tobacco of the highest quality 
was found only in the Upper South; the southern antebellum 
tobacco manufacturing kingdom was wholeheartedly absorbed by 
the Confederate States of America when the four states of 
the Upper South (Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
Arkansas) seceded from the Union in 1861.
MIn 1860, there were 261 tobacco factories in 
Virginia; 158 were located in: Richmond (52) , Lynchburg 
(47), Danville (39), and Petersburg (20). The remaining 103 
tobacco mills were distributed through small towns and 
county districts. U.S. Census, 1860; also, see Appendices 
12-14.
65Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 187.
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CHAPTER 2
TOBACCO: A MISMANAGED CONFEDERATE ASSET
Tobacco was a primary economic commodity and an 
invaluable resource for the Confederate States of America. 
The regulation and taxation of southern tobacco was closely 
monitored by Confederate authorities, and provided the South 
with a dependable source of revenue. Tobacco was an 
agricultural article which figured heavily into the 
political decisions made by the Confederate government 
during the war.
Unfortunately, the Confederate domestic tobacco trade 
was at a virtual standstill in the South by December 1863.1 
War had a damaging effect upon the health of the Confederate 
tobacco industry. However, Confederate policy was 
inevitably far more detrimental than war to the economic and 
political potential that tobacco presented to the interests 
of the Confederate States of America. Confederate tobacco 
policy was inconsistent, contradictory, and misconstrued. 
Poorly designed tax policy and harmful legislation prevented 
tobacco from becoming the valuable diplomatic asset the
'J.H. Pemberton to James Thomas, Jr., Augusta,
Georgia, 8 December 1863, Thomas Papers.
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Confederacy had hoped it would be.
How did the Confederacy apply its tobacco policy to 
its economic and political interests during the war? What 
factors prevented tobacco from becoming the Confederate 
asset it should have been? Why was Confederate policy more 
destructive to the overall potential of tobacco than the 
chaos and disruption of war?
Five factors which contributed to the eventual 
paralysis of the Confederate tobacco trade during the war 
were:
1) the attack on Fort Sumter and the subsequent 
commercial chaos which resulted;
2) transportation and communication disruptions;
3) the capture or destruction of tobacco by Federal 
armies;
4) impressment of tobacco and capital by Confederate 
authorities;
5) inconsistent, inappropriate, and misconstrued 
policies of Confederate tobacco legislation which 
governed tobacco taxation and regulation.
The first four factors were byproducts of war; all 
had a damaging influence on the well-being of the 
Confederacy's tobacco industry. Ironically, it was the 
final factor, Confederate policy, which had the most 
devastating effect on the potential that tobacco presented 
to Confederate interests during the war.
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The prosperity of Southern domestic tobacco commerce 
was shattered by the turmoil which swirled around Fort 
Sumter in April 1861; a Charleston-based tobacconist 
surveyed this controversy with the prophetic observation 
that "we are in constant expectation now of an attempt to 
reinforce Fort Sumter, and we are fully prepared to meet it. 
If it is attempted it will be a bloody fight and they can't 
whip us."2 The usually brisk trade that Southern 
tobacconists enjoyed before hostilities began dropped off 
significantly after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter on 
12 April 1861. A Boston tobacconist lamented that "as to 
trade, it is dull and inactive necessarily as from the 
insanity of our national disturbances."3 The overwhelming 
fear that resulted following the official commencement of 
war fueled doubts about the future of Confederate tobacco 
trade in New York4 and Philadelphia.5 Business between 
tobacconists north and south of the Richmond area suffered 
dramatically as the political schism widened between the 
United States and the Confederate States. "In the present
2Adams Frost to James Thomas, Jr., Charleston, 10 
April 1861, ibid.
3Fisher and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 9 April 
1861, ibid.
4C.M. Connolly to James Thomas, Jr., New York, 10 
April 1861, ibid.
5Bucknor, McCammon and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 
Philadelphia, 16 April 1861, ibid.
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warlike attitude of the country, there seems to be a general 
disinclination to do business."6 Anxious times prevailed as 
the purveyors of Virginia tobacco sought to maintain their 
business contacts across the country; tobacconists soon 
realized that the future was gloomy and uncertain, at best.
As military hostilities intensified in 1861, tobacco 
dealers in Boston7 and New York8 negotiated feverishly with 
major Confederate tobacco manufacturers in order to 
stockpile large quantities of the increasingly valuable 
leaf. At the same time, some Confederate tobacco dealers 
feared their tobacco would be subjected to mob violence in 
Northern cities.9 As war preparations became more intense 
both in the North and the South, Northern military 
provisions, including the use of naval blockade, slowly 
squeezed off the flow of tobacco to cities north of the 
Mason-Dixon line. Richmond-area tobacconists responded to 
this challenge by shipping their tobacco north upon vessels 
flying the flags of foreign nations.10 Southern cities which
6J.T. Doswell to James Thomas, Jr., Nev; Orleans, 20 
April 1861, ibid.
7J.H. and S.G. Thayer to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 24 
April 1861, ibid.
8William H. Price to James Thomas, Jr., New York, 27 
April 1861, ibid.
9Fisher and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 27 April 
1861, ibid.
10Brothers Boninger to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 19 
April 1861, ibid.
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were blockaded by the Federal navy later saw their tobacco 
trade gradually dwindle to nearly nothing."
The Confederate tobacco trade was hampered by 
interruptions in communication and transportation throughout 
the war. Mail delivery from Northern cities to all 
secessionist states was suspended at the commencement of 
hostilities between the North and South in April 1861.12 
Northern tobacconists expressed their displeasure regarding 
communication difficulties to their Southern counterparts: 
"This hide-go-seek way of communicating with our good 
Virginia friends is too bad and shameful in the extreme."13 
Mail delivery between points within the Confederacy was 
inconsistent and unreliable at best. "Miscarriages in the 
mail were often caused by the new postmasters who were not 
acquainted fully with the distribution of the different 
mails that they received."14 Mistakes were critical because 
the vast majority of Southern tobacconists had relied upon 
the mail in communicating with business associates 
throughout the United States and abroad.
"Adams Frost and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Charleston, 
30 May 1861, ibid.
12Bucknor and McCammon and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 
Philadelphia, 12 April 1861, ibid.
"Fisher and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 11 June 
1863, ibid.
"William H. Deans to James Thomas, Jr., Fairfax Court 
House, Va. , 1 September 1861, ibid.
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Tobacconists in the Richmond vicinity experienced a 
great deal of difficulty in transporting their tobacco to 
their customers living both in the North and the South.
After a year of war, Lincoln's naval blockade effectively 
bottled up Southern ports; to complicate matters, ice and 
snow frequently impeded the transportation of tobacco upon 
inland waterways in the South during the winter months.
The Confederate government strictly controlled 
railroad transportation; tobacco shipments slowed due to the 
transfer of railroad cars to other lines in order to 
transport troops to front lines.15 Also, Confederate rail 
lines were occasionally severed by enemy sabotage. In 
addition, tobacconists throughout the Confederacy always 
faced the possibility that their valuable cargo could be 
confiscated by the enemy in an unexpected raid upon a 
railroad or a warehouse.16 Rail transport became 
increasingly difficult as tobacco had to be rerouted away 
from rail lines which were occupied or destroyed by the 
enemy.17 Troop transportation impeded the commercial flow of
1SR.F. Lester to James Thomas, Jr., Petersburg, 7 March 
1862, ibid.
16R.F. Lester to James Thomas, Jr., Petersburg, 14 
March 1862, ibid.
17J.H . Pemberton to James Thomas, Jr., Augusta,
Georgia, 11 December 1861, ibid.
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tobacco as well as other important commodities.18 The 
evacuation of tobacco by boat was simply "out of the 
question"19 while families, merchants, and officials all 
grappled for the limited supply of river craft that was 
commandeered for military use. Tobacco subject to 
confiscation by the enemy in North Carolina and Virginia was 
generally moved out by rail into the country or was 
transported to a major Southern city which was considered to 
be safe.20 Some tobacconists panicked and sold their crop 
while it still had some value; others stowed it away with 
the hope that it would be valuable once the war was over or 
when normality and stability returned to the tobacco 
market.21
Richmond was at the nucleus of Virginia's rail 
network. The economic success of Richmond tobacco 
manufacturers such as James Thomas, Jr., William Barrett, 
James H. Grant, and Thomas C. Williams was closely linked to 
the dependability and integrity of Virginia's railroads. 
Tobacco was transported on each of Virginia's six major rail 
lines; the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac, the Orange
18David G. Potts to James Thomas, Jr., Petersburg, 21 
March 1862, ibid.
19Thomas C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 23 
February 1865, ibid.
20Ibid.
2ICharles B. Ball to William T. Sutherlin, Richmond, 3 
March 1864, Sutherlin Papers.
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and Alexandria, the Virginia Central, the Petersburg and 
Weldon, the Richmond and Danville, and the Southside were 
all used by Confederate tobacco manufacturers and dealers in 
the transportation of tobacco to market. Federal advances 
in the field of battle in 1861 and 1862 resulted in the loss 
of strategic stretches of Confederate railroad. The Federal 
incursion into the Fairfax and Alexandria area prior to the 
battle of First Manassas resulted in the loss of the 
northern extreme of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac 
line. Vital stretches of the Orange and Alexandria line 
were also lost to the Federals in early 1862, making tobacco 
shipping more difficult to western markets. McClellan's 
movement against Richmond in May of 1862 caused tobacconists 
such as Thomas and Williams to ship quantities of 
manufactured tobacco upon the Petersburg and Weldon railroad 
to Wilmington and points south, where it was safely out of 
the reach of the enemy.22 The communication and 
transportation needs of the Confederate tobacco trade became 
increasingly more difficult to satisfy as Union armies 
gained control of vital southern cities such as Norfolk, 
Nashville, Memphis, and New Orleans.
When major cities came under direct Federal assault 
in late 1861 and early 1862, tobacco planters and 
manufacturers feared for the safety of their tobacco,
22Dougias Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), 4:450-70, 477.
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machinery, and property.23 As Federal forces threatened
Richmond in May of 1862, the Confederate government ordered
that all tobacco in the city be placed in one central
location so that it could be burned if necessary without
destroying other property.24 Such governmental orders
generally affected Confederate tobacco men "like a clap of
thunder in a clear sky."25 William Barrett, a close friend
of James Thomas, Jr., and a prominent tobacconist from
Richmond, was unfazed by the threat of invasion:
I continue to indulge the hope that the Yankee 
vandals may not reach this place-should they be able 
to do so all my stock of my tobacco amounts to at 
least eighty thousand dollars will most likely fall 
into their hands, and which I would sooner reduce to 
ashes.26
In early 1862, tobacco planters, manufacturers, and 
traders shared the concerns and uncertainties that were 
predominant throughout the South. Tobacconists in Southern 
cities expressed their fears about the prospect of Federal 
confiscation in their business correspondence. In March and 
April of 1862, tobacco dealers in the manufacturing and
^H. Harrison and Son to James Thomas, Jr., Nashville, 
10 July 1861, Thomas Papers.
24Thomas C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 2 
May 1862, ibid.
^Thomas C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 1 
May 1862, ibid.
26William Barrett to William J. Pendleton, Richmond, 1 
March 1862, Pendleton Papers.
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distribution centers of Richmond,27 Wilmington,28 
Fredericksburg,29 Memphis,30 and Savannah31 all expressed 
consternation at the stark prospect of being occupied by 
Federal forces, and losing their tobacco to confiscation.
At this time, however, one Atlanta-based tobacconist, J.B. 
Robonable, predicted that his enterprise was safe from the 
effects of war: "This being in the heart of the South, we do 
not think the Yankees will ever penetrate so far!”32
This independent spirit was evident in a statement 
made by a tobacco manufacturer in Richmond at the time of 
the Seven Days Battle in June 1862: "I am not at all
alarmed yet. I don't think the Yankees will ever get 
here.”33 Tobacconists throughout the Confederacy attempted 
to carry on with life and business despite the limitations 
that the war presented.
27Coleman Wortham to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 24 
April 1862, Thomas Papers.
28R.F. Lester to James Thomas, Jr., Petersburg, 24 
March 1862, ibid.
29Castleman and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 
Fredericksburg, 8 March 1862, ibid.
30J .B . Sharpe and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Memphis, 16 
March 1862, ibid.
31Joseph Sichel to James Thomas, Jr., Savannah, 18 
March 1862, ibid.
32J.B. Robonable to James Thomas, Jr., Atlanta, 16 
April 1862, ibid.
33Coleman Wortham to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 7 May 
1862, ibid.
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The enemy did not present the only source of wartime 
danger and disruption to the Confederate tobacco industry. 
Southern tobacco planters and manufacturers were also 
subject to the Confederate policy of impressment. Field 
hands, factory workers, slaves, and even tobacconists 
themselves were subject to the Confederate draft for 
military obligations as Lee's depleted army inducted new 
members. Many men of draft age in the tobacco business 
complained that "a substitute cannot be had at any price, 
but, I will try and get one in the country somewhere."34 
While tobacco operations of Richmond factories were not 
exempt from conscription, field hands that were necessary 
for planting, plowing, and harvesting were difficult to find 
for hire due to the overall shortages of manpower in the 
South.35 As Union lines crept closer to the heartland of the 
tobacco kingdom in 1863, slaves were more inclined to flee 
to the safety which "Yankee" lines provided.36 Tobacconists 
could expect their factories to be subject to impressment by 
the Confederate government. Tobacco machinery and 
equipment, as well as the article itself, were vulnerable to
^H.W. Broadus to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 27 
January 1863, ibid.
35H.W. Broadus to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 13 
January 1863, ibid.
36Washington Duke to General James Cox, Durham, 27 
October 1863, Washington Duke Papers, Special Collections, 
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
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impressment as the Confederacy struggled to sustain its war 
effort.37
At this time, necessity and practicality required the 
Confederate government to take unusual steps to secure 
quarters for captured Federal soldiers. The Confederate War 
Department took over a number of tobacco factories and 
warehouses in Richmond during the war. In 1861, Federal 
prisoners captured during the battle of First Manassas were 
housed in J.L. Liggon's and J.O. Harwood's factories in 
Richmond; later in 1861, General John H. Winder commandeered 
a tobacco warehouse owned by W.H. Gwaltney. In 1862, 
Confederate authorities converted the Scott and Pemberton 
warehouses into Confederate prisons bearing the same names. 
As more prisoners continued to stream into Richmond in 1863, 
more space was required to accommodate them all. The 
tobacco factories of R.H. Mayo, J.H. Grant, Turpin and 
Yarbrough, W.H. Ross, Crew and Pemberton, J.B. and A.L. 
Royster, and William Barrett were all impressed by General 
Winder. In late 1863, four thousand prisoners from Richmond 
were transferred to Danville where they were quartered in 
six tobacco factories.38 The Confederacy also established 
three military hospitals in Lynchburg which were housed in
37Thomas C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 29 
April 1862, Thomas Papers.
38Henry Putney Beers, Guide to the Archives of the 
Government of the Confederate States of America (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), 253-55.
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tobacco warehouses.39
As war materiel became increasingly more difficult 
for the Confederate army to acquire, Confederate Secretary 
of War James A. Seddon issued a directive permitting 
necessary provisions for the army to be procured in exchange 
for Southern tobacco and cotton.40 Seddon also empowered 
Confederate officials with the authority to impress one half 
of the tonnage of any Southern vessel carrying tobacco, 
cotton, sugar, molasses, or rice for the purpose of raising 
revenue or procuring war supplies.41
Confederate tobacco legislation had the most 
overwhelmingly negative influence on the southern tobacco 
industry. The contradictory and unfocused nature of the 
Confederacy's tobacco policy undermined the economic and 
political benefits that the article presented. Misconstrued 
tax legislation added to the economic burden that tobacco 
manufacturers were forced to bear within the Confederacy's 
wartime economy. Inappropriate regulations were also 
imposed upon the cultivation, transportation, manufacture, 
and sale of tobacco. These self-inflicted impositions
39Ibid., 194.
40Seddon to Lee, Richmond, 19 February 1364, Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of 
the Rebellion (hereafter cited as ORA), U.S. War Department 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901),
4th ser., III, 154.
41Declaration of Correspondence, Richmond, 5 March 
1864, ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 187.
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prevented the tobacco industry from becoming the asset the 
Confederacy had hoped it would be.
From 1860 to 1865, the annual per capita consumption 
of tobacco in the Confederate states was one and one-half 
pounds. This meant that the southern population (7,000,000) 
annually consumed about 10,500,000 pounds of tobacco.42 The 
Confederate government believed that the taxes derived from 
this quantity of tobacco would be a significant source of 
war-sustaining revenue. Confederate tobacco policy, for 
better or worse, evolved during the war in an awkward and 
almost haphazard fashion.
Once the war started, Confederate officials were well 
aware of the potential leverage that tobacco could provide 
to foreign relations. Therefore, in March 1861, the 
Confederate Congress passed a resolution which "prohibited 
the exportation of tobacco overseas unless in exchange for 
munitions of war."43 The prohibition of Southern tobacco 
commerce to Europe was designed to create a tobacco famine 
in Europe which would invariably compel countries such as 
Great Britain and France to attempt to break the Federal 
blockade. At this time, the Confederate House of
42Meyer Jacobstein, The Tobacco Industry in the United 
States. Studies in History, Economic, and Public Law (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1907), no. 3, 26:44.
43Confederate States of America, Journal of the 
Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905), March
1862, 5:256-57.
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Representatives passed a resolution designed to support the 
war effort. Tobacco was purchased by the government at one- 
fourth its value in treasury notes; the remainder of the 
article was paid for in Confederate bonds bearing eight 
percent interest over twenty years.44
In the early months of the war, speculation ran 
rampant in the Northern press in regard to the size and 
potential of the Confederacy's upcoming tobacco and cotton 
crops for 1861.45 Federal economists were already clearly 
aware of the raw possibilities of Southern tobacco, cotton, 
sugar, and rice. Federal officials recognized that the 
Confederacy's most likely chance at gaining Europe's 
official political acceptance lay within the realm of 
foreign attraction and dependence upon Southern agricultural 
commodities. Officials within Jefferson Davis's 
administration realized the commercial and political 
importance of the tobacco crop; in August 1861, the Congress 
of the Confederate States of America passed an act which 
specifically forbade the shipment of Southern tobacco to 
European neutrals.46
The party with whom the Confederates were locked in
'“Southern Historical Society, Southern Historical 
Society Papers (Richmond: William Byrd Publishing Co.,
1923), 18 March 1862, no. 6, 44:114-15.
i5New York Times, 12 July 1861.
46An Act of the Congress of the Confederate States of 
America, 2 August 1861, ORA, 4th ser., I, 529.
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mortal combat, the Federals, was also interested in catering 
to the tobacco demands of Europe. The U.S. government 
placed a heavy tax on exported tobacco.47 In 1861, the 
Confederate tobacco industry was enriched by $19,278,621 as 
a result of tobacco revenue which was gained from tobacco 
sales to Europe. An additional $10,000,000 was earned from 
tobacco sales to Northern concerns.48 French and British 
entrepreneurs shared the concerns of Northern businessmen as 
to what crops of tobacco, cotton, and grain would be planted 
by Southerners in the spring of 1862.49
Confederate tobacco policy continued to develop in 
April 1862 with a senatorial decision to acquire 30,000 
hogsheads of tobacco (30,000,000 pounds) from Confederate 
planters in exchange for bonds paying eight percent 
interest. This development resulted from an earlier act of 
the Confederate Congress, Statute 117 of 16 May 1861. This 
provision established what came to be known as the Produce 
Loan. In an effort to raise $50,000,000, Secretary of the 
Treasury C.R. Memminger authorized agents to purchase 
tobacco and cotton in exchange for bonds paying eight
47United States. The Statutes at Large, Treaties, and 
Proclamations of the United States of America (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1862), 37th Cong., 2nd sess., Ch. 119, 463.
ilDeBow's Magazine 32 (1862): 121-22.
49New York Times, 4 March 1862.
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percent interest.50 Provisions were made to allow the 
Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate the sale of this 
tobacco to England or France with the hope that political 
recognition would result.51
Shortly thereafter, the Confederate Congress enacted 
a resolution which prohibited the transportation of tobacco 
to Confederate territory in possession of the enemy.52 The 
Federal internal revenue act passed by Congress during the 
summer of 1862 inadvertently aided the interests of the 
Confederacy. A heavy tax was placed upon tobacco grown in 
the Union; this, coupled with importation regulations placed 
on the leaf by Britain and France, increased the 
desirability of Confederate tobacco, and its value as a 
political bargaining chip.53 Strict laws and provisions were 
imposed by Confederate legislators upon tobacco cultivation, 
sale, and exportation as the importance of the leaf grew.
The Confederate Senate approved a bill in October 1862 which 
permitted the impressment of tobacco by the Confederate 
treasury for the purpose of its exportation to foreign
50Beers, 115.
51 Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of 
America, 2:454-55.
52ORA, 4th ser., I, 1077.
53Frank L. Olmstead, "Tobacco Tax of 1863 to 1864," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 5 (January 1891): 193-219.
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nations "sympathetic" to the Confederate cause.54 Tobacco 
was subject to an increasingly heavy tax as the war consumed 
the Confederacy's dwindling sources of revenue.55
Revenue generation continued to be of major interest 
to the Confederacy in 1863. The Confederate Congress 
implemented an eight percent tax on all tobacco profits as 
early as January 1863. As inflation ran rampant and tobacco 
sales bottomed out, tobacconists such as James Thomas, Jr. 
and Thomas C. Williams feared that their produce and 
machinery would be taken by the government for failure to 
pay taxes.56 The Congress of the Confederate States of 
America added a two-and-one-half percent sales tax upon the 
tobacco industry in March 1863; this legislation added to 
the already heavy burdens felt by those in the Confederate 
tobacco trade.57
The Confederate House of Representatives passed
another bill in early 1863 which provided for
an export duty on cotton and tobacco exported from 
the Confederate States to the ports or in the ships 
of any foreign country which has not recognized the 
independence of the Confederate States of America.
A duty of forty cents per pound of raw tobacco shall
54Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of 
America, 2:452-57.
55 Arno Id, 21.
56T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 20 
January 1863, Thomas Papers.
57William D. Quisenberry to James Thomas, Jr. ,
Richmond, 18 March 1863, ibid.
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be levied to provide revenue for the defense of the 
Confederacy.58
One month later, the Virginia General Assembly 
repealed a bill "to prohibit the production of tobacco as of 
12 March 1863."59 This act had called for an increase in the 
production of grain, and forbade the cultivation of tobacco 
except in the case of domestic consumption. As provisions 
became more scarce for the Confederate armies in the field, 
the Congress of the Confederate States of America passed a 
joint resolution in April 1863 which banned the growth of 
tobacco and cotton altogether, and ordered the production of 
food crops in order to feed the hungry soldiers in gray.60
As economic and military developments worsened for 
the Confederacy in 1863, the Confederate House of 
Representatives relaxed its ban on tobacco cultivation and 
passed a resolution which simply recommended that tobacco 
planters not cultivate a crop during the year; this 
recommendation suggested that planters grow crops of 
consumable provisions instead to support the army and
58Marjorie L. Crandell, ed., Confederate Imprints: A
Checklist Based Primarily on the Collection of the Boston 
Atheneum (Boston: Boston Atheneum, 1955), Confederate
States of America, House of Representatives, 5 February 
1863, no. 21 (hereafter cited as Crandell).
S9Crandell, no. 2327.
“Joint Resolutions of the Congress of the Confederate 
States of America, 4 April 1863, ORA, 4th. ser., II, 468.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
general populace.61 As war-sustaining revenue became scarce, 
the Confederate House passed a tax on tobacco on 24 April 
1863 which assessed the article on the basis of its grade 
and quality.62 These provisions were not supplying the 
Confederacy with the revenue they were intended to generate, 
nor were they bringing Great Britain or France any closer to 
recognizing or assisting the Confederate States of America. 
Consequently, the Confederate Senate passed a resolution 
that gave the government the authority to sell and dispose 
of any tobacco in the possession of Confederate citizens. 
This tobacco was consequently sold overseas at a price no 
less than two hundred percent over the purchase price. The 
revenue from these tobacco sales was used to pay off 
outstanding treasury notes.63
As times became increasingly desperate, influential 
tobacconists such as James Thomas, Jr. of Richmond and 
William T. Sutherlin of Danville used their social and 
commercial stature as a means of lobbying for their 
financial interests in the Confederate House and Senate in 
Richmond. Men of their wealth, power, and prestige were 
advised by Congressmen such as Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry:
61Southern Historical Society Papers, no. 10, vol. 48, 
1941, 191-92.
62Ibid. , no. 12, vol. 50, 1953, 299.
63Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of 
America, 4:76-77.
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"In any matter connected with the government, of course, you 
have but to intimate your wishes. Your acquaintance with 
the chief officers however will give you, at all times, 
access to them."64 Lobbying by successful and influential 
tobacconists like Thomas or Sutherlin nevertheless failed 
largely because legislators from the cotton-producing states 
of the Deep South fought hard to preserve the economic and 
political integrity of their interests. Most tobacco 
legislation was designed and supported by Confederate 
Congressmen from the Deep South.
While the Federal blockade continued to squeeze the 
flow of Confederate tobacco and cotton to Europe, Great 
Britain and France began to look to the United States for a 
reliable supply of a quality grade of tobacco. The lack of 
Confederate tobacco upset the trade balance of the tobacco 
market in Europe. Thus, the regulation and taxation of 
Northern tobacco became a primary concern of the United 
States Congress until the end of the war.65 This fact did 
not go unnoticed by the Federal Commissioner of the United 
States Department of Agriculture, Isaac Newton. In a 
document addressed to the U.S. Senate in January 1864,
Newton expressed his concern that a tax on tobacco grown in
MJabez Lamar Monroe Curry to James Thomas, Jr., 
Richmond, 7 February 1863, Thomas Papers.
65United States. The Statutes at Large, 38th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1864, Ch. 171, 203, 262, 475-77.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
the United States would be detrimental to Northern farmers, 
and, in the long run, would contribute to the marketability 
of Confederate tobacco.66 Almost simultaneously, the 
Congress of the Confederate States of America approved an 
act which was designed to "regulate the collection of the 
tax in kind to tobacco, and to amend the act entitled 'An 
act to levy taxes for the common defense and carry on the 
Government of the Confederate States of America. ' 1167
In the early spring of 1864, Confederate Adjutant and 
Inspector General Samuel Cooper officially established and 
implemented a monthly ration of tobacco to every enlisted 
man in the Confederate army (this ration was three-quarters 
of a pound per month) .68 This act was modified shortly 
thereafter when the Confederate Senate passed two 
resolutions which were designed to bring some morale- 
boosting comfort to the Confederate soldier. The standard 
monthly eight-dollar bounty (wage) of the common foot 
soldier was complemented by a three-quarter-pound ration of 
tobacco valued at three dollars.69 Soldiers had the option
^.S. Congress, Senate, Letter of the Commissioner of 
Agriculture, 38th Cong., 1st sess., Misc. Doc. 13, 1864.
67An Act of the Congress of the Confederate States of 
America, 30 January 1864, ORA, 4th ser., III, 63-64.
68An Act of the Congress of the Confederate States of 
America, 17 February 1864, ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 299.
69Southern Historical Society Papers, no. 13, 51: 161,
1929.
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of electing smoking or chewing tobacco; the soldier could 
also request the financial equivalent of his ration instead 
of receiving tobacco.70
At this point in the war, some opportunistic 
Southerners capitalized on the tobacco and cotton famine in 
Europe, and engaged in the smuggling of these valuable 
commodities. The exportation of tobacco through Mexico to 
either of the major European neutrals was strictly regulated 
by the Confederate Treasury and War Departments,71 and
provided the Confederate States of America with a small
source of revenue. Orders were issued to General Robert E.
Lee to be vigilant for the illegal transportation of tobacco
whenever feasible.72 As a result, a surprisingly large 
amount of Lee's time off the field of battle was spent 
enforcing the regulations of the Confederate Department of 
the Treasury.
In 1864, large chunks of Confederate territory fell 
into the hands of the enemy. The Confederate Department of 
War issued orders which prohibited the exportation of 
tobacco into any part of the Confederacy occupied by the
70Ibid. , no. 14, 52:345-46, 1930.
^Correspondence of the Confederate States of America, 
Richmond, 11 March 1864, ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 206-7, 239-40.
^Seddon to Lee, Richmond, 23 March 1864, ORA, 4th 
ser., Ill, 245-46.
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enemy.73 This provision was designed to deprive the enemy of 
tobacco.
General Lee offered insightful suggestions as to the 
prevention of tobacco smuggling by private entrepreneurs.
The general provided reasonable guidelines which outlined 
the regulation and profit-sharing of revenue resulting from 
the shipment of tobacco overseas.74 As the noose tightened 
around the neck of the Confederacy, the Confederate House of 
Representatives "imposed a duty on tobacco and an additional 
duty on cotton which was exported from the Confederate 
States of America"75 in an effort to raise desperately needed 
revenue.
During the winter of 1864-1865, the Congress of the 
Confederate States of America ordered the destruction of any 
quantity of tobacco or cotton which could possibly aid the 
enemy in its prosecution of the war.76 An editorial 
published in DeBow's Magazine at this time demonstrated the 
value which tobacco was considered to have to the 
Confederate war effort:
Congress has acted wisely in requiring all the
73General Orders, no. 23, Richmond, 29 March 1864, ORA, 
1st ser., LI, pt. 2, 842-43.
74Lee to Noland, Headquarters of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, 12 April 1864, ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 285-87.
75Crandell, no. 477.
76General Orders, no. 4, Richmond, 8 February 1865,
ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 1066.
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cotton and tobacco in the Confederacy to be burned 
when in danger of falling into the hands of the 
enemy. This is legitimate warfare, and must tell 
upon this contest. By destroying arms and 
provisions and towns we gain little or nothing.
These they have without stint. Cotton and tobacco 
are specie-gold and silver. We had as well 
surrender the coffers of our banks into their hands 
as these. They are more than specie. They are the 
levers with which the enemy can move courts and
cabinets at their will. If the great staples of the
South are to become the instruments of our 
subjugation, let us have no more of them.77
Southern military defeats in mid- to late 1863 and 
early 1864 sealed the fate of the Confederacy, as well as 
its domestic tobacco trade. Exorbitant tax and insurance 
rates caused tobacco prices to skyrocket. Major seaports 
and railways remained blockaded and occupied by the enemy.
Federal armies occupied or were laying siege to the
principal commercial and population centers of the South. 
American specie became increasingly scarce as Confederate 
currency became nearly worthless. The domestic tobacco 
trade of the Confederacy was at a virtual standstill by 
December 1863 ,78 where it remained until the end of the war 
Tobacco was an agricultural commodity which held great 
promise in terms of the fortunes of Confederate domestic 
policy. Its failure foreshadowed that of Confederate 
foreign trade and foreign diplomacy.
77DeBow's Magazine 33 (1862): 91.
78J.H. Pemberton to James Thomas, Jr. , Augusta, 
Georgia, 8 December 1863, Thomas Papers.
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CHAPTER 3
CONFEDERATE TOBACCO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The thriving prosperity of the southern foreign 
tobacco trace was shattered by the American Civil War. The 
Federal naval blockade which enveloped the Confederate coast 
from the Potomac to the Rio Grade virtually ended the 
Confederacy's international tobacco trade by the end of 
1863. Abraham Lincoln issued his proclamation of a naval 
blockade of ports in the Confederate States of America on 19 
and 27 April 1861. The Union was actually capable of 
effectively enforcing the provisions of the presidential 
proclamation (at least in the capes of Virginia) on 30 April 
1861.'
Although some Confederate tobacco did break through 
the blockade via foreign vessels and Confederate blockade 
runners, the flow of tobacco from southern ports to European 
customers was slowly cut off. As a result, European clients 
began to patronize other countries for a steady and reliable 
source of tobacco, among them being the United States of 
America. By 1863, the Confederate international tobacco
'Mountague Bernard, A Historical Account of the 
Neutrality of Great Britain During the American Civil War 
(New York: Lennox Hall, 1971), 226-27, 234.
46
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
trade was essentially neutralized as a direct result of the 
effects of the naval blockade and competition from other 
tobacco-producing nations.
Despite the obstacles and privations that the war and 
blockade presented, Confederate tobacconists carried on a 
surprisingly successful tobacco trade with their 
counterparts in England, France, Holland, Germany, and 
Australia. Tobacco manufacturers of the Richmond vicinity 
used ingenuity, guile, and sound business acumen to 
counteract the suffocating effect of the Federal blockade.
When hostilities officially began in April 1861, 
Confederate tobacconists across the broad expanse of the 
North and South rushed off communications and orders to 
their manufacturers and suppliers in Richmond. Southern 
tobacco dealers in port cities from Charleston to New 
Orleans were all anxious to maintain their lucrative trade 
with European tobacco houses.2 And, before the Federal 
naval blockade was firmly in place, Northern tobacconists in 
such places as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
and San Francisco feverishly attempted to secure final 
shipments of tobacco before being forbidden to do so by the
2Among the Confederate tobacco dealers active in this 
capacity in mid-April of 1861 were: Adams Frost
(Charleston), Van Benthuysen and Crofton (New Orleans), and 
J.T. Doswell (New Orleans).
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Federal government.3 As requests poured into the offices of 
major manufacturers in Richmond from points across the 
country, concerns mounted that a reliable and steady supply 
of Virginia tobacco would soon be next to impossible to 
obtain. Tobacco that was planted, cultivated, harvested, 
cured, and packaged over the course of one calendar year was 
not ready for market until January of the following year.
It was roughly a thirteen-month process. Tobacco 
manufacturers such as James Thomas, Jr. were extremely 
anxious to export as much of the leaf as possible in April 
and May 1861 due to the restricting factors of time and 
blockade. Conversely, tobacco dealers and speculators in 
New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and San Francisco were 
interested in acquiring as much Virginia tobacco as possible 
both for northern consumption and for export to foreign 
markets. From 18 April 1861 to 1 May 1861 alone, James 
Thomas, Jr. received shipment orders from the following 
northern tobacco merchants: Ludlam and Heineken, Fisher,
Ricards and Co., the Brothers Boninger, Mailler, Lord, and 
Quereau, Greene, Heath, and Allen, and Mercer, Antello and 
Co. Northern dealers annually bought $10,000,000 worth of
3Among those Northern tobacco dealers struggling to 
maintain their European trade at the outbreak of war in mid- 
1861 were: J.H. and S.E. Thayer (Boston), Ludlam and
Heineken (New York), Fisher, Ricards and Co. (New York), 
Mercer and Antello and Co. (Philadelphia), the Brothers 
Boninger (Baltimore), and Greene, Heath, and Allen (San 
Francisco).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
tobacco from southern manufacturers prior to the war.4
Leading Confederate tobacconists such as James 
Thomas, Jr. of Richmond were more than happy to ship as much 
tobacco overseas as possible upon vessels flying the flag of 
either foreign countries, the United States, or the 
Confederacy. Thomas, mentioned earlier as the most 
prominent tobacco manufacturer in the antebellum South, 
continued his tobacco trade with European customers in 
earnest during the war by shipping massive quantities of the 
leaf, prior to the actual enforcement of the blockade, to 
London's oldest and most respected tobacco firm, the house 
of John K. Gilliat.5
Several colleagues of James Thomas, Jr., privately 
questioned the tobacco magnate about his perceived excessive 
caution and anxiety as to the possible outcome of the war, 
as well as the future prosperity of trade with Europe. 
Thomas, in his astute foresight, gave John K. Gilliat power 
of attorney over all of his tobacco business dealings with 
firms in Europe and Australia. In doing so, Thomas was 
virtually guaranteed of maintaining at least a portion of 
his vast wealth of tobacco and profits.6 And, before the 
workings of the blockade were in place, provisions were made
*DeBow's Magazine 32 (1862): 121-22.
5John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 
29 May 1861, Thomas Papers.
6Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
by Thomas as well as other tobacconists in the Confederacy,
to ship as much tobacco from Southern ports as possible to
eager customers in Europe and Australia. This spirit was
evident in a letter written by Ludlam and Heineken and Co.
of New York to Thomas after the outbreak of war:
We write a hasty line to say that the news from 
Washington city and the South—the certainty of a 
blockade of all the Southern ports-the heavy orders 
known to be here for tobacco for European markets— 
the fact that speculators have entered in the market 
and are operating very extensively—all these facts 
conspire to make us believe that there never has
been a more favorable chance for speculators and
shippers of tobacco and we therefore beg leave to
advise large shipments from you.7
Shortly after receiving this advisory note, Thomas 
received a message from Fisher, Ricards and Co. of 
Melbourne, Australia; this firm had American officers based 
both in San Francisco and New York. "We have since the 
great convulsion . . . suggested your making some shipments 
to Australia; this we could confidently advise at this time 
as general shipments have to a great extent ceased."8 By 
the end of April 1861, Thomas was shipping tobacco to 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam through Baltimore upon vessels of 
foreign countries.9 Tobacco was also being sent from
7Ludlam and Heineken and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., New 
York, 18 April 1861, ibid.
8Fisher, Ricards and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., New 
York, 21 April 1861, ibid.
9Brothers Boninger to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 27 
April 1861, ibid.
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Richmond to the New York office of the Australian tobacco 
house of Mailler, Lord, and Quereau. This tobacco was 
subsequently shipped to Lord's home office in Melbourne.10 
Another Australian firm, Greene, Heath, and Allen, wrote 
Thomas and plaintively stated that "we cannot think of being 
without your tobacco."11 As emotions heightened in May 1861, 
many tobacconists in the Confederacy feared that their 
valuable tobacco shipments might not be safe in Northern 
ports as their cargo awaited transport to Europe and 
beyond.12 On 3 May, a Baltimore merchant assuaged one 
Richmond manufacturer's fears by stating that "as to the 
safety of your property here you may feel perfectly at ease 
and that also we will be able to ship them safely out of 
this port (Baltimore), . . . now since your ports are 
blockaded."13 Prior to the complete enforcement of the 
Federal blockade, Baltimore was used regularly as an outlet 
for southern tobacco which was shipped to Europe and 
Australia. Jacob Heald and Company and the Brothers 
Boninger were two Baltimore firms who handled the
10Mailler, Lord, and Quereau to James Thomas, Jr., New 
York, 27 April 1861, ibid.
"Greene, Heath, and Allen to James Thomas, Jr. , San 
Francisco, 30 April 1861, ibid.
12Mercer and Antello and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 
Philadelphia, 1 May 1861, ibid.
"Brothers Boninger to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 3 
May 1861, ibid.
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exportation of tobacco overseas for James Thomas, Jr.. 
Tobacco which originated in Richmond was generally shipped 
out of Baltimore upon ships of foreign registry. This 
outlet faded in use as it became increasingly difficult to 
ship tobacco from Richmond to Baltimore. Once the Federal 
naval blockade was in place, Baltimore ceased to be an 
outlet for outgoing Confederate tobacco.
Confederate tobacco manufacturers tried desperately 
to maintain their trade with foreign markets for obvious 
reasons. In 1859, France and her colonies imported 
43,661,635 pounds of American tobacco; the treasury of 
France gained $36,000,000 in revenue which resulted from 
importation duties placed on this tobacco.14 British 
consumption of American tobacco for 1858, 1859, and 1860 
was, respectively, 33,739,133 pounds, 34,459,864 pounds, and 
35,306,846 pounds. In 1860, the British duty on tobacco 
imported from the U.S. was $.75 per pound of leaf tobacco 
and $2.25 per pound of manufactured tobacco.15 In 1860, 
Britain continued to levy a heavy duty on imported American 
tobacco. During the year it gained £35,000,000—one eighth 
of the entire revenue brought in by Britain in 1860. France 
(not including its colonies) gained $25,000,000 from duties 
placed on American tobacco in 1860, about one-half of all it
14DeBow's Magazine 31 (1861): 334.
I5Ibid., 335.
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obtained from duties annually.16 The tobacco trade 
constituted the South's second-most valuable market in 1860; 
only the economic value of cotton ($161,000,000) exceeded 
that of tobacco ($14, 612,442) .17
The full implementation of the Federal blockade in 
May 1861 had a constrictive effect upon the ability of 
Confederate tobacconists to ship their valuable cargo 
overseas to Europe and Australia. A Rotterdam tobacco firm 
expressed its concern regarding the disruption of the 
tobacco trade due to the naval blockade by saying that "it 
is very difficult to form a correct opinion of the future of 
the article, everything depending upon turns things may take 
on your side."18 As the Federals tightened their grip upon 
Confederate ports, tobacconists in Australia complained 
about the uncertainty and unreliability of written messages 
from Melbourne, Sydney, and Adelaide reaching the Southern 
capital in Richmond.19 The "political troubles" which 
plagued tobacco interests in the Confederacy were described 
by H.H. Meier and Co., a German tobacco house: "It is
difficult to say what the course will be, our market is
I6Ibid., 204-5.
17U.S. Census, 1860. See also Appendix 13 on page 130.
18Mees and Moens to James Thomas, Jr. , Rotterdam, 15 
May 1861, Thomas Papers.
19Lord and Co. to James Thomas, Jr. , Melbourne, 24 May 
1861, ibid.
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going to take in reference to prices of tobacco . . ."20.
The prospects of Virginia tobacconists were also lessened by 
the influx of tobacco from Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, 
and Ohio into European markets. The tobacco from these 
territories within or near Union strongholds was quickly 
supplanting Virginia tobacco which was more expensive and 
more difficult to acquire.21
British tobacco houses such as Robert Edwards of 
Liverpool and John K. Gilliat of London expressed their 
lament at the scarcity of Virginia tobacco reaching their 
ports: "For the present we see that our business operations
with your country may become very limited and that this 
season we are likely to get little or no tobacco."22 In late 
May 1861, the house of Gilliat observed that "all shipments 
now can only be made at great risk . . . as we can hold out 
no hope of any interference on the part of the British 
government which has declared its intentions of maintaining 
a strict neutrality."23
Following the full implementation of the Federal 
blockade on 3 0 April 1861, "all vessels passing the Capes of
20H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 15 
May 1861, ibid.
21Ibid.
“John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 
29 May 1861, Thomas Papers.
“Ibid.
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Virginia will be warned off, and those passing Fortress 
Monroe will be required to anchor under the guns of the 
fort, and subject themselves to an examination."24 Vessels 
encountering the blockade the first time within fifteen days 
of the blockade's establishment (before 16 May) were warned 
and allowed to proceed. Vessels that were stopped by the 
blockade squadron after that date were subject to 
confiscation as a prize of war.25
Tobacco which was actually seized by the blockading 
squadron en route from Virginia to the British Isles caused 
major concerns to parties on both sides of the ocean. 
Confederate manufacturers lost their valuable tobacco to 
Union authorities as a prize of war; European speculators 
lost money and opportunity in a major way, also. Two 
vessels laden with Confederate tobacco and bound for Britain 
fell prey to the blockade at this time. On 20 May the 
British barque Hiawatha was seized in Hampton Roads; shortly 
thereafter, on 21 May, the British schooner Tropic Wind was 
also seized as a prize of war. They carried 445 tons and 63 
tons respectively.26
In the Hiawatha incident, Robert Edwards, a British 
tobacconist placed a claim for the seized contraband in a
24Bernard, 231.
“ibid., 235-36.
“Bernard, 233.
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Federal court of admiralty. His tobacco house in Liverpool
complained to James Thomas, Jr., in Richmond that:
I have taken legal advice about obtaining your 
tobacco, and find I cannot do so without rendering 
myself liable to an action for perjury in case it 
goes to trial, as I must swear before the U.S. 
consul as well as a magistrate that the tobacco is 
bonafide my own property.27
The seizure of Confederate tobacco and the ensuing
legal and financial repercussions did little to discourage
the blockade-running spirit of Southern tobacconists and
their British customers. As the magnitude of war escalated
and the efficiency of the blockade improved, less tobacco
reached the shores of Britain during the summer of 1861.28 A
prominent London tobacco house, G.F. Davis and Sons,
captured the feeling of uncertainty which pervaded the
Confederate tobacco trade by stating:
In no trade have the effects of the American Civil 
War upon the English market been more clearly 
defined than in the tobacco trade. Since the 
commencement of the conflict between the northern 
and southern states, the trade of this country in 
tobacco has undergone a complete revolution. The 
quantity of American growth of that article now used 
in the United Kingdom is not much more than one-half 
what it was two years ago, and it is gradually 
decreasing; indeed it is extremely problematical if 
the American consumption in this country will ever 
reach its former amount, for the growth of other 
countries is now so freely used that it threatens to
^Robert Edwards to James Thomas, Jr., Liverpool, 21 
June 1861, Thomas Papers.
28C.R. Somervail to James Thomas, Jr., London, 21 June 
1861, ibid.
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supersede the American growth altogether.29 
Less than 17,000,000 pounds of Confederate tobacco reached 
Great Britain in 1861, compared to nearly 35,000,000 pounds 
in 1860.
Prices for the scarce Virginia article continued to 
rise in Great Britain, and upon the European continent as 
well. At this time, in a letter to James Thomas, Jr.,
Robert Edwards quoted the price of good Virginia tobacco to 
be between £9 and £12 per five hundred pounds.30 A Bremen 
tobacco firm encouraged a Confederate house to continue to 
ship tobacco through the blockade, despite the enormous 
risks, "Should things with you continue as heretofore, we 
may of course see prices with us advance further. On the 
other hand, it needs but the rumour of a reopening of 
Southern ports to cause a total stand in sales at the 
present value."31 One clever ploy used by Confederate 
blockade runners carrying tobacco was to employ vessels not 
only flying the British flag, but also, using ships which 
were registered to legitimate British companies.32 Tobacco
29U.S. Congress, Senate, Letter of the Commissioner of 
Agriculture, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 1864, 13.
30John K. Gilliat to James Thomas, Jr., Liverpool, 7 
September 1861, Thomas Papers.
31D.H. Watjen to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 31 August 
1861, ibid.
32Dudley Nichols to James Thomas, Jr. , Savannah, 21 
October 1861, ibid.
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which was manufactured in Richmond would frequently be 
shipped south by rail upon the Petersburg and Weldon or the 
Richmond and Danville railroads. This tobacco eventually 
made its way to Confederate blockade runners in Wilmington, 
Savannah, or Charleston. Confederate tobacco runners were 
always on the lookout for a daring captain who had "never 
been spoken to at sea since running the blockade while 
escaping Old Abe's clutches."33
In the fall of 1861, Confederate tobacconists 
continued to dare the blockade in an attempt to keep their 
contacts with the European tobacco market alive. Australian 
firms such as Fisher, Ricards and Company and Francis 
McPherson continued to import Confederate tobacco into the 
port of Melbourne. Financial arrangements between 
Australian firms and Virginia manufacturers were generally 
mediated by the London house of Gilliat.34 Money belonging 
to Confederate manufacturers remained in the protective 
hands of British banks such as the First Exchange of London 
and the Chartered Bank of Australia.35 By the year's end, 
however, tobacco of high quality could no longer be shipped 
out of New Orleans upon fast steamers to Havana. Prior to
33Ibid.
^J.K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 19 
September 1861, Thomas Papers.
35Lord and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Melbourne, 26 
September 1861, ibid.
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the fall of New Orleans, quantities of coffee and other 
provisions could be acquired for importation into the 
luxury-starved Confederacy.
As the war entered into its second year, Confederate 
tobacconists continued to export their valuable tobacco crop 
through the Federal gauntlet. Southern tobacco continued to 
reach customers in London, Liverpool, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
Bremen, Antwerp, Melbourne, and Sydney. Confederate 
tobacconists gained the patronage of a new European customer 
in January 1862. The Italian Regie, the official tobacco 
company for that country, entered into the Virginia tobacco 
market through a Confederate intermediary, D.H. Watjen and 
Company of Bremen, Germany.36
Although statistical data is limited, documentation 
from the United States 38th Congress demonstrates that the 
Federal government exported an extraordinary amount of 
tobacco to Europe at the beginning of the war. Great 
Britain imported 2,847,130 pounds of tobacco from northern 
states in 1861 alone. The North exported 152,562,200 pounds 
and 144,303,400 pounds in 1861-62 and 1862-63 respectively. 
This tobacco translated into an economic bonanza for the 
Federal government: $13,394,086 for 1861-62 and $23,149,777
36D.H. Watjen and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 3 0 
January 1862, ibid.
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for 1862-63.37 Overall tobacco production for the United 
States in 1862 and 1863 was 208,000,000 pounds and
258,000,000 pounds respectively.38
The Italian Regie operated much in the same way as 
its monopolistic counterpart in France; although smaller in 
scale the Italian Regie mirrored the French Regie in terms 
of purpose, function, and value. Each served as the tobacco 
monopoly for their respective governments. The French Regie 
was "inextricably interwoven within France's revenue system 
and closely intertwined in important agricultural 
interests."39 The French Regie generated revenue for the 
nation's treasury by placing duties on all imported tobacco. 
"These taxes were not restrictions but were revenue 
measures, the most important in France except for those on 
salt."40
In 1830, the French Regie contributed
about six percent of the revenues received by the 
French government. Tobacco factories employed some
16,000 laborers in ten factories and twenty 
entrepots. The flow of tobacco through these 
factories and through 350 wholesale and 30,000 
retail outlets was supervised by some 13,000 
officials. The capitalization of the French regie 
at this time was estimated at 200,000,000 francs and
37U .S. Congress, Senate, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., Misc. 
Doc. No. 13, 21 January 1864.
38Ibid.
39Duncan, 293.
40Ibid.
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its annual profits at nearly 450%.41
In 1860, the French Regie employed over 30,000 people
who were involved in tobacco manufacture, sales, and 
administration.42 The tobacco monopoly of France "was at 
once a foundation sill of French fiscal policy and a bar to
the development of a free market for American (and later,
Confederate) tobacco in France."43
The British government had a stringent policy in 
regard to tobacco importation. Once it entered the country, 
all imported raw and manufactured tobacco had to be 
transported to official warehouses of the Customs 
Commission. The imported tobacco was weighed, prized, and 
then assessed to determine the duties (importation taxes) 
which were to be placed on the article. The penalty for 
failing to follow this procedure resulted in a forfeiture of 
the tobacco and a fine of twenty pounds sterling. These 
heavy restrictions discouraged the smuggling of tobacco into 
Britain, and guaranteed the Crown a steady flow of revenue.44 
The British carefully documented all proceedings which arose 
as a result of the seizure of illegally imported tobacco. 
Regular reports recorded the nature of the judicial
41Ibid., 283.
*2DeBow's Magazine 31 (1861): 334.
43Duncan, 300.
^Edgar L. Erickson, ed., British Sessions Papers (New 
York: Readex Microprint, 1966), 16 February 1863, 187-93.
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proceedings which were involved in each case, the fine or 
sentence which was levied, and the resolution of the tobacco 
which was seized.45 These restrictions raised the price of 
Confederate tobacco to exorbitant levels and forced tobacco 
consumers in Britain to seek alternative sources.
British importers sometimes complained that 
substantial portions of tobacco were arriving in damaged 
condition. Tobacco which was shipped overseas in hogsheads 
(a barrel which weighed anywhere from 1,400 to 1,600 pounds 
when entirely packed with tobacco) frequently arrived at its 
destination in a less than optimum state. Mold, heat, and 
deterioration all contributed to the devaluation of the 
article.46 The physical decomposition of Virginia tobacco 
during shipment was only one of several problems which 
troubled Confederate tobacconists during the war.
Correspondence between tobacco firms in the 
Confederacy and clients overseas became increasingly more 
difficult as the war dragged on in late 1862. The 
Australian firm Lord and Co. justified its lack of 
correspondence to a Confederate manufacturer at this time by 
saying that "we have not written you for some time as there 
was no way we could feel certain the letter would reach
45Ibid., House of Commons, vol. 53, 7 March 1864, 723-
29.
^John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 
Liverpool, 8 March 1862, Thomas Papers.
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you.”47 Foreign tobacco firms complained that "all our 
letters have for a long time been returned to us";48 
communications difficulties also accentuated the economic 
hardships that foreign tobacco houses experienced during the 
war. One Australian firm spoke for all foreign consumers of 
Confederate tobacco by stating that "we hope ere long to see 
your handwriting again and trust that the troubles of your 
country will soon be settled, and that the way may be clear 
for your shipments and that we may soon be favored with 
further consignments from you."49 A Bremen concern echoed 
these statements in its correspondence with a Richmond firm 
by saying that it was "hoping that peace may soon be 
restored and we may have often hereafter the pleasure of 
corresponding with you."50
As 1862 drew to a close, the foreign demand for 
Virginia tobacco subsided as foreign tobacco began to 
supplant Virginia leaf. High prices reduced the demand for 
Confederate tobacco in Europe as the blockade gradually 
reduced the exodus of Confederate tobacco into foreign
47Lord and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Melbourne, 24 May 
1862, ibid.
48Lord and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Melbourne, 25 
September 1862, ibid.
49Ibid.
50F.M. Victor and Sons to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 10 
October 1862, Thomas Papers.
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ports.51 These factors caused one tobacco house in Rotterdam
to remark that
tobacco in general remains quiet and buyers take 
reluctantly what they want for immediate consumption 
only. We sincerely hope that the political troubles 
on your side may be soon settled and that we may 
then resume our correspondence to mutual advantage.52
By 1863, the unfortunate reality for Confederate and 
European tobacconists alike was that the Federal naval 
blockade would never again allow a "normal” resumption of 
tobacco trade between Confederate manufacturers and foreign 
tobacco houses. Europeans began using tobacco substitutes 
for the highly valued Confederate leaf. Tobacco from 
Holland, Java, Greece, Turkey, Paraguay, and Egypt was far 
more available to consumers in Europe, and was, of course, 
much less costly.53
In the spring of 1863, some European tobacco houses 
closed their accounts with Confederate manufacturers 
altogether, rather than continue to absorb wartime losses.54 
Dutch and German firms such as Mees and Moens, H.H. Meier, 
and F.M. Victor and Sons settled their tobacco accounts with
5iF.M. Victor and Sons to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 25 
October 1862, ibid.
52Mees and Moens to James Thomas, Jr., Rotterdam, 23 
December 1862, ibid.
53John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 
10 January 1863, ibid.
MMees and Moens to James Thomas, Jr., Rotterdam, 20 
February 1863, ibid.
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James Thomas, Jr. in mid-1863. Continental demand for 
southern tobacco was virtually nonexistent due to the 
availability of foreign substitutes. As military and 
economic conditions in the South worsened, many Confederate 
tobacconists found themselves wishing that they had been 
more meticulous in their prewar financial planning; nearly 
all Southern tobacco manufacturers, agents, planters, and 
exporters felt the heavy weight of the Civil War upon their 
trade with Europe as the year progressed.55 The European 
demand for Virginia tobacco gradually decreased in 1863 as 
the article became increasingly more expensive and more 
difficult to obtain. "An increase in the consumption of 
[tobacco] substitutes and liberal supplies from New York"56 
each continued to exacerbate the Confederacy's rapidly 
weakening tobacco trade.
The relentless pressure which the naval blockade 
exerted upon the Confederate economy had an overwhelmingly 
stifling effect upon the South's ability to maintain any 
semblance of trade with its tobacco markets in Europe and 
Australia. Lincoln's naval blockade virtually ended the 
Confederate international tobacco trade by the close of 
1863. Adding to the troubles of the Confederacy's foreign
55John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 
28 April 1863, ibid.
56H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 3 
July 1863, ibid.
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tobacco trade was competition from other tobacco-producing 
nations. European and Australian consumers relied upon 
cheaper and more accessible sources of the weed as less 
Confederate tobacco reached the continent. Foreign 
countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and the United 
States furnished Europe with the quantities of tobacco it 
desired at a price it was willing to pay. By employing the 
naval blockade, the Federal government used the economic 
tenet of supply and demand to its advantage. Confederate 
tobacco was prevented from reaching the shores of Europe.
As quantities of the article became scarce on the European 
market, prices soared out of reach of the consumer. The 
void left by the absence of Confederate tobacco was filled 
by tobacco substitutes which were both affordable and 
obtainable. The failure of the Confederate foreign tobacco 
trade was inexorably connected to the Confederacy's 
difficulties in diplomacy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4
CONFEDERATE TOBACCO AND FOREIGN DIPLOMACY
Diplomatically, tobacco was a matter of interest and
concern to the Confederacy in one primary area. Tobacco (as
well as cotton, of course) was used as a bargaining chip by
the Confederate States of America in its effort to gain
independent status and official political recognition from
two of the world's greatest economic and military powers:
Great Britain and France. An editorial published by the New
York Times at this time underscored the potential diplomatic
value that tobacco could provide to Confederate interests in
foreign policy. The Times suggested:
It may not be out of season to inquire how far the 
fate of the world is based on smoke, in other words, 
what is likely to be the effect of the blockade on 
the tobacco supply of the European markets? Tobacco 
is probably, after salt, the object whose 
consumption is most generally diffused. The 
generous tobacco is the gentleman's saint and 
soldier's idol.1
The editorial reported that the United States supplied Great
Britain with one half of its annual tobacco consumption of
60,000,000 pounds; the Times also stated that the United
States furnished between three-fourths to four-fifths of the
lNew York Times, 2 October 1861.
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tobacco annually consumed in France.2
Both Great Britain and France contemplated the merits 
of recognizing Confederate independence in light of their 
dependence on Southern tobacco and cotton.3 Confederate 
diplomats hoped that each power might resort to acts of war 
in order to break the Federal blockade and to preserve their 
reliable supply of revenue which resulted from the 
importation of Confederate tobacco.4 Tobacco was an 
instrument of Confederate foreign diplomacy with Britain and 
France in several instances during the Civil War. Each 
political crisis could have potentially brought Britain or 
France into a political and military alliance with the 
Confederacy. "King Tobacco" diplomacy inevitably failed in 
each of the following cases:
• the Hiawatha and Tropic Wind incidents;
• the Trent affair;
• the Franco-Confederate attempt to ship French- 
owned tobacco to France through the blockade.
In March 1861 Confederate emissaries William Yancey, 
Pierre A. Rost, and A. Dudley Mann traveled to Europe on 
behalf of the fledgling government of the C.S.A. to
2Ibid. Please refer to chapter 3 for statistics 
describing British and French tobacco consumption, 
importation, and taxation.
3New York Times, 26 January 1861.
4Debow's Magazine 31 (1861): 204-5.
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negotiate direct trade agreements with Great Britain and 
France. Confederate diplomats discovered that many European 
tobacconists were in regular communication with their 
respective governments in regard to tobacco policy.5 
Foreign governments realized that a plentiful and high- 
quality grade of Confederate tobacco would be among the many 
Southern agricultural crops which could be exchanged for 
manufactured goods (exceeding 150 million dollars in 1861) 
which were formerly purchased by the South from Northern 
concerns.6 Government commissioners who presided over the 
British and French tobacco industries seriously considered 
the idea of breaking the blockade of Confederate ports as a 
means of re-opening channels of trade with Confederate 
tobacco manufacturers.7
Because blockade running was the only viable 
transportational option that Confederate businessmen had in 
exporting tobacco and cotton overseas to European customers, 
some Southern tobacco manufacturers attempted to receive the
sJohn K. Gilliat and Co., W.E. and H.O. Wills, G.F. 
Davis and Sons, Grant, Hodgson and Co., R.S. Maitland and 
Co. of London, and Robert Kerr and Son, W.A. and G. Maxwell, 
Robert Edwards, and William Somervail and Son of Liverpool 
were among the leading British tobacco firms during the 
American Civil War. The House of Rothschild was the major 
private tobacco concern of France. The French and Italian 
Regie were the official tobacco monopolies of these states, 
respectively. Major Dutch, German, and Australian tobacco 
houses are listed in Appendix 3, page 117.
6New York Times, 19 March 1861.
7Ibid., 7 November 1861.
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permission of the Federal government to allow Northern or 
foreign vessels free passage through the blockade to 
Southern ports. Unfortunately, Confederate tobacconists 
learned that "no vessel— foreign or otherwise, can get 
clearance for any Southern port and a strict blockade is 
enforced at the mouth of the James River."8 The Federal 
blockade received the close scrutiny of both Great Britain 
and France. The complex legal provisions of international 
law strictly governed how belligerents and neutrals were to 
conduct themselves in maritime affairs during a time of 
blockade or war.
Southern tobacco merchants were forced to hurdle a 
myriad of bureaucratic obstacles in the form of Federal 
prize courts and courts of admiralty as the legal provisions 
of the blockade were enforced. The legal representatives of 
Confederate tobacco houses faced a mountain of litigation in 
the process of getting confiscated vessels and cargo 
released. In early May 1861, one Confederate advisor, Jacob 
Heald of Baltimore, reported to Richmond tobacconist James 
Thomas, Jr.:
The writer has just got back from Washington and 
after two days of very unpleasant and troublesome 
labor succeeded in getting released the three 
schooners now at the navy yard in Philadelphia. In 
conversation with Mr. Seward (Secretary of State) 
and Mr. Welles (Secretary of Navy), the writer was 
given to understand that a claim for damages of
8Fisher, Ricards and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., New 
York, 4 May 1861, Thomas Papers.
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either vessels or cargo would not be entertained by 
government-^that in these wartimes the innocent must 
bear their part and it was not within the reach of 
their departments to make any distinction in the 
discharge of a strict duty-^that we ought to be glad 
to have our property released. We . . . will engage 
the service of a good maritime lawyer for the 
purpose of preparing the necessary papers with which 
to go before a court of claims.9
Many Confederate victims of the blockade learned that "the
Courts of Admiralty in charge required before relief the
affidavits of the owner of the vessel and representatives of
the cargo, that no claim or claims would be preferred
against the U.S. government based upon their seizure or
detention.1110
The Federal seizure of the British ships, the 
Hiawatha and the Tropic Wind in May, and the Trent in 
November 1861, created shock waves within the political 
circles of the Confederate States, Great Britain, France, 
and the United States. All three vessels, seized without 
warning by Federal warships, were of British registry and 
flew the flag of Great Britain. The Hiawatha incident 
tested the international integrity of the Federal blockade 
for the first time. This case was meticulously studied by 
both belligerents and neutrals alike.
The barque Hiawatha was filled to near capacity with
9Jacob Heald to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 23 May 
1861, ibid.
10Jacob Heald to James Thomas, Jr. , Baltimore, 30 May 
1861, ibid.
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445 tons of tobacco which was exported from the Confederacy
through the port of Richmond and was en route to London when
captured in Hampton Roads on 20 May 1861 by the American
steamer, the Star.n The prestigious tobacco house of
London, John K. Gilliat and Company, was due to receive the
tobacco cargo of the Hiawatha. Gilliat described the
Hiawatha incident in the following manner to James Thomas,
Jr., who owned a substantial portion of the cargo:
We are informed that the Hiawatha has been taken by 
the blockading squadron and sent round to New York 
as a prize. We cannot suppose she will be condemned 
if we understand the question right; a British ship 
sailed before the expiration of the time allowed 
neutrals to depart—we think the flag will cover the 
property [tobacco]. We shall do all that can be 
done for our [Confederate] friends. We are bringing 
in parliamentary influence . . . as we cannot 
suppose that any nation is desirous to predicate 
difficulties with this country on questions of 
maritime law.12
Testimony from Confederate and British parties 
involved in the Federal trial on the Hiawatha incident 
maintained that the barque and her crew were well within 
their right to sail freely through the Federal blockade from 
Richmond on 16 May 1861. The Hiawatha was unable to depart 
from Richmond's deep water port of City Point until 18 May 
for want of a steam-tug. The Federal government had only 
established an effective blockade on 1 May 1861; Confederate
11 London Times, 28 October 1861.
12John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 
8 June 1861, Thomas Papers.
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officials contested the Federal confiscation of the Hiawatha
by citing the following Federal proclamation:
Neutral vessels will be allowed fifteen days to 
leave port after the actual commencement of the 
blockade, whether such vessels are with or without 
cargoes, and whether the cargoes were shipped before 
or after the commencement of the blockade. 3
The Confederacy maintained that the Hiawatha was within her
right to pass through the blockade unmolested. The case
concerning the Hiawatha and her full cargo of tobacco came
to court in late July of 1861; the solicitor and attorney
who acted on behalf of the English consul in the case stated
prior to the hearing that he "feared the judgment will go
against him."14 Immediately before the decision was made
upon the Hiawatha and her cargo, John K. Gilliat cryptically
remarked "should the judgment be adverse, an appeal ought
unquestionably to be made to the Supreme Court, although
under the existing state of things we should feel no
security that justice would be even there administered."15
On 30 September 1861, the Hiawatha and her cargo were
condemned by a Federal District Court in New York, by a
Judge Betts. Robert Edwards, a powerful tobacco house in
Liverpool, predicted that the case would be carried into the
13London Times, 28 October 1861.
14Fisher, Ricards and Company to James Thomas, Jr., New 
York, 20 July 1861, Thomas Papers.
15John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 
31 August 1861, ibid.
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Supreme Court.16 Indeed, the higher court later reversed the 
decision upon the Hiawatha and her cargo of tobacco; in a 
communication to Richmond in late 1861, John K. Gilliat 
surmised that this decision was overturned as a result of a 
major tenet of international law-the principle of free ships 
and free trade.17
Actually, the Supreme Court overturned the original 
condemnation of the barque Hiawatha for two principal 
reasons. The Supreme Court reasoned that the use of a naval 
blockade was recognized by international law as the right of 
a belligerent nation at war. The high court ruled that "the 
Federal Courts could not recognize the existence of a public 
or civil war carrying with it belligerent rights until it 
had been recognized by Congress. A state of civil war was 
only recognized for the first time by an Act of Congress, 13 
July 1861.1118 As a result, the Supreme Court ordered that 
all ships captured as prizes of war prior to this date be 
released by the Federal government. The second legal tenet 
which contributed to the release of the Hiawatha was the 
observation that the British captain of the ship had 
complied with the Federal decree of leaving within fifteen
16Robert Edwards to James Thomas, Jr. , Liverpool, 11 
October 1861, ibid.; New York Times, 1 October 1861.
17John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
18 October 1861, Thomas Papers.
18Bernard, 90-91.
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days of the effective implementation of the blockade. The 
court ruled that British officers aboard the Hiawatha had 
acted in good faith in observing the Federal deadline for 
the departure of neutrals, and that their delay was due to 
no fault of their own.19
The first of these two interpretations of 
international law handed down by the Federal Supreme Court 
applied to the case of the Tropic Wind. The sixty-three ton 
British schooner was laden with tobacco which was owned by 
James Thomas, Jr., and was seized by the Federal squadron in 
Hampton Roads the day after the Hiawatha was seized, on 21 
May 1861. Citing the ruling on the seizure and release of 
the Hiawatha, the District Court of the United States for 
the District of Columbia ordered the release of the Tropic 
Wind and her cargo.20 The Tropic Wind proceeded on its way 
from Washington to Halifax, Nova Scotia in October 1861, 
where the tobacco cargo was shipped to London.21
Although the Trent affair did not directly involve a 
cargo of Confederate tobacco, this volatile political crisis 
of late 1861 did have a profound impact upon the value and 
demand for Confederate tobacco in European markets. As news 
spread across Europe of the Federal seizure of the Trent,
19Ibid., 235-36.
20Ibid. , 97-98.
21J.M. Carlisle to James Thomas, Jr., Washington, D.C.,
22 June 1861, Thomas Papers.
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H.H. Meier and Company, a major tobacco house in Bremen,
Germany remarked that
the seizure of the commissioners Mason and Slidell 
has caused a very great sensation in Europe. We 
doubt whether peace will be concluded before next 
spring and consider therefore the present calmness 
in the tobacco market as unfounded and transitory.22
As war between the United States and Great Britain became an
immediate possibility, a Confederate tobacconist in New
Orleans gleefully predicted that
should a war break out between the Yankees and Great 
Britain, there is no doubt but some of our ports 
would soon be opened and this one about the first as 
Norfolk would still be blockaded by the forts and 
Savannah and Charleston by the fleets rendezvousing 
at Port Royal and Hatter as.23
The tobacco traders of Europe secretly hoped for a 
peaceful solution to the Trent affair. One German 
tobacconist observed that "since France has adopted the 
English view of the Trent affair, people are inclined to 
think that the government at Washington will give 
satisfaction; hence the increased confidence in peace."24 
European speculators in the Confederate tobacco trade hoped 
for a peaceful resolution to the crisis because this would 
prolong the Federal blockade, and therefore make it more
22H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 28 
November 1861, ibid.
23Van Benthuysen and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., New 
Orleans, 30 December 1861, ibid.
24H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 30 December 
1861, ibid.
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difficult for Confederate tobacco to leave Southern ports. 
When news reached Europe in January 1862 that the crisis had 
been peacefully resolved by the governments of Great Britain 
and the United States, European tobacco houses across the 
continent rejoiced at the prospect of a limited but steady 
supply of Confederate tobacco reaching their ports. No 
longer would they have to fear a massive influx of 
Confederate tobacco which would drive prices to exorbitant 
levels.25
The final and most important diplomatic story 
involving tobacco during the Civil War developed in the 
spring of 1862. The principal players in this drama were 
Judah P. Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of State; John 
Slidell, Confederate Commissioner in Paris; Alfred Paul, 
French consul in Richmond; Henri Mercier, French minister in 
Washington; Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, French foreign 
minister; William H. Seward, American Secretary of State; 
and William L. Dayton, American minister in Paris. The 
particular issue raised by these diplomats involved two 
quantities of tobacco which were bought and paid for in late 
March and early April 1861. Alfred Paul, acting as an agent 
for the French Regie, purchased 7,000 hogsheads (about
10,500,000 pounds) of tobacco, and the New York firm of 
August Belmont had purchased 2,200 hogsheads (about
25John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr. , 
Liverpool, 11 January 1862, ibid.
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3,300,000 pounds) for the Paris branch of the Rothschilds.26
The episode began only as
a complicated commercial operation, but developed 
into a doubled-edged diplomatic weapon: the South
used it to test the Federal blockade, and the North 
used it to counter the early French policy towards 
Confederate naval activities in France. It involved 
two informal understandings between Great Britain 
and France and an informal convention between the 
United States and France.27
The French Foreign Minister assigned to Washington, 
Baron Henri Mercier and Alfred Paul, Consul of France 
assigned to Richmond, were both active in negotiating with 
Confederate and Federal authorities as a means of securing 
the tobacco and bringing it through the blockade. In April 
1862, Mercier arrived in Norfolk, and officially began 
French efforts to gain control of the Rothschild tobacco 
sequestered in Confederate warehouses in Richmond.28 Alfred 
Paul was instructed by Mercier to make arrangements to have 
the Rothschild tobacco transferred to the warehouse which 
stored the Regie tobacco. The French government wanted the 
tobacco of the Rothschilds and the Regie stored together as
26Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer, The United States 
and France: Civil War Diplomacy (Philadelphia: The
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 526-27. Warren F. 
Spencer's article, "French Tobacco in Richmond during the 
Civil War," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 
71 (April 1963): 185-202, is included in this volume and is 
an outstanding detailed examination of this tobacco-related 
controversy.
27Case and Spencer, 526.
28Nev York Times, 18 April 1862.
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neutral property in warehouses protected under the French 
flag of neutrality. The French feared that the Confederate 
government might confiscate the Rothschild tobacco as 
private property. When Confederate authorities in Richmond 
attempted to seize the Rothschild tobacco in May 1862,
French consul Paul took the matter to the Confederate States 
District Court. The court decided in favor of the 
Rothschilds, and allowed Paul to store all of the tobacco 
together as protected neutral property.29
The focus of these developments shifted briefly 
across the Atlantic to Paris following the Confederate 
decision on the Rothschild tobacco. John Slidell, the 
Confederate commissioner assigned to Paris, was very much 
aware of the potential leverage that tobacco could exert 
upon the cause of bringing about official French recognition 
of the C.S.A. Slidell's communication with the 
Confederacy's first Secretary of State R.M.T. Hunter in July 
1862 formally requested that the Rothschild and Regie 
tobacco be removed from Richmond and shipped through the 
blockade to Paris.30 The Confederate commissioner wrote a 
lengthy letter to French Foreign Minister Edouard Thovenal 
one week later. What he outlined was the tantalizing
29Case and Spencer, 527; also Spencer, 187-88.
30Slidell to Hunter, Paris, 14 July 1862, State 
Department Papers, Confederate States of America, Division 
of Manuscripts, MSS, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
(hereafter cited as Pickett Papers).
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economic bounty of Confederate tobacco, cotton, rice, and 
sugar that could be had as a benefit of French recognition 
of the independence of the Confederacy.31 The Confederate 
tobacco shortage did not escape the attention of Emperor 
Louis Napoleon. Several of the emperor's closest advisors 
feared that the loyalty and morale of France's 600,000 
soldiers would weaken if tobacco rations continued to 
dwindle. Based on a monthly tobacco ration of three-fourths 
of a pound per soldier, the French army consumed 5,400,000 
pounds of tobacco annually. As a result, the Regie made the 
acquisition of Confederate tobacco a matter of top priority 
and political expediency.32
In January 1862, the recently-appointed French 
foreign minister Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys instructed Alfred 
Paul to secure permission to send the French tobacco to 
France. Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin granted 
permission provided that the tobacco was shipped through 
City Point on the James. American Secretary of State Seward 
granted the French permission to move the tobacco through 
the blockade, provided that it was shipped out of Savannah, 
Georgia.33 With the Confederate and the American governments 
at a philosophical impasse on this issue, Mercier presented
31Slidell to Thovenal, Paris, 21 July 1862, ibid.
32New York Times, 2 October 1861.
33Case and Spencer, 527.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
Seward with an alternative; Mercier "suggested that the 
United States could buy French goodwill if they allowed the 
tobacco to leave from the James River, through the Hampton 
Roads blockade."34 In July 1862, Seward agreed to Mercier's 
proposal only if specific approval was obtained from Great 
Britain in moving the tobacco through the blockade.35 
Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin also agreed to allow 
the French tobacco to pass through Confederate territory 
provided that the French vessels transporting the tobacco 
did not stop at any point along the way that was held by the 
enemy. Benjamin believed that Federal approval allowing 
safe passage to the French tobacco tacitly implied "an 
absolute abandonment of the blockade to the world at 
large."36
United States minister to France, William L. Dayton, 
lobbied heavily for a relaxation of the blockade in order to 
allow the French tobacco to reach the Emperor. In this way, 
the Federal State Department hoped to beat the Confederacy 
to the diplomatic punch by winning the favor of tobacco- 
starved France.37 Also, the Federal government hoped that
^Ibid.
35Ibid. , 528-29.
36Ibid.
37Dayton to Seward, Paris, 21 October 1863, U.S. 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1861-1957),
II, 724.
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the goodwill gesture might discourage the likelihood of 
France sponsoring the construction or re-arming of 
Confederate warships in French ports. Federal efforts to 
win the approval of the French emperor were not in vain. 
French ministers Mercier and Drouyn de Lhuys each thanked 
Federal Secretary of State Seward for his cooperation and 
assistance in allowing for a relaxation of the blockade to 
accommodate the shipment of the Regie tobacco from Richmond 
to France.38
This diplomatic cooperation was short-lived. In 
September 1863, Seward received a disturbing message from 
Dayton. The Confederate cruiser Florida had recently sailed 
into the French port of Brest. To make matters worse,
Dayton reported to Seward that he had convincing proof that 
Confederate ironclads were being constructed in Bordeaux and 
Nantes. Seward immediately withdrew Federal permission to 
move the tobacco through the blockade upon hearing this 
news.39 When word of this decision reached French Foreign 
Minister Drouyn de Lhuys, he immediately suspended French 
permission to arm the Confederate ships at Bordeaux and 
Nantes. "Seward obviously felt that his action on the 
tobacco affected the decision to withhold armaments from the
38Dayton to Seward, Paris, 25 December 1863, FRUS 
(1863), no. 390, 11.
39Case and Spencer, 530-31.
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Confederate vessels under construction."40
On 23 November 1863, Seward and Mercier drew up an 
"Informal Convention under which the exportation of certain 
tobacco from within limits under blockade shall be 
governed."41 This convention between France and the United 
States was valid for five months (until 23 April 1864) and 
was the governing document for the remainder of this complex 
ordeal. The French government ordered Consul Alfred Paul to 
make the necessary arrangements to hire neutral ships for 
the passage of the French tobacco. Logistical problems and 
contradictory communications between Paris and Washington 
prevented Paul from beginning transportational arrangements 
until April 1864. Paul sailed up the James with an escort 
of the French corvettes, the Tisaphone and the Grenada, who 
accompanied the two British freighters that were to carry 
the tobacco, the Bidwell and the Miller.42
The neutral convoy reached City Point safely on 21 
April 1864. After having only 150 hogsheads of tobacco 
loaded, Paul was ordered by General Benjamin Butler to 
return to Fort Monroe because the time limit for the tobacco 
operations had expired.43 Prior to leaving, Paul visited
40Ibid., 532.
41Ibid., 532-33.
42Ibid. , 535-36.
43Ibid. , 537.
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Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin and advised him of 
the present circumstances. Benjamin was terribly upset upon 
hearing the news of the Franco-American convention, and 
reminded Paul that the agreement between the Confederacy and 
France clearly stipulated that French tobacco could not 
pause or stop in any territory held by the enemy once it 
left City Point for the open sea. The convention was 
especially objectionable to Benjamin because “France 
recognized the pretentions of the United States to a control 
over neutral vessels and their crews while in Confederate 
ports. ',44
The failure of the French to acknowledge openly 
Confederate sovereignty in order to gain their valuable 
supply of tobacco was a bitter diplomatic embarrassment to 
the South. As a consequence of France's seeming shift in 
policy, the C.S.A. "emphatically refused to permit the 
exportation of French tobacco to a nation which appeared to 
deny its independence."45 Benjamin declared that no French 
vessel could be allowed to take on cargo in any Confederate 
port until the convention was dissolved. From a Confederate 
standpoint, the fate of the French tobacco was sealed when 
Secretary of State Benjamin officially rejected France's
“Ibid., 539.
45Milledge L. Bonham, Jr., "The French Consuls in the 
Confederate States," Studies in Southern History and 
Politics. Inscribed to William Archibald Dunning (New York: 
Kennikat Press, 1914), 92.
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request to export the tobacco in September 1864. Benjamin 
justified his decision by stating that the French had 
"entered into a convention with our enemy so objectionable 
in its character and so derogatory to our rights as an 
independent power that we have been forced to withdraw 
permission" to ship the French their tobacco.46
After these serious diplomatic setbacks in 1863 and 
1864, Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon ordered 
Colin J. McRae "to take charge of all Confederate securities 
deposited with Fraser, Trenholm and Company, and to 
distribute these funds to Confederate purchasing agents"47 in 
London and Liverpool. Fraser, Trenholm and Company was a 
highly successful and widely respected firm involved in the 
fields of banking, importation, and exportation. By taking 
over the responsibility of the Confederacy's securities with 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company in Liverpool, McRae, in effect, 
became the Confederacy's European Secretary of the Treasury. 
In this capacity, McRae wrote Confederate Treasury Secretary 
Christopher G. Memminger and suggested that the government 
take control of all exports, and that the Confederacy 
impress all cotton and tobacco in the South and use them to
“^Benjamin to Hotze, Richmond, 20 September 1864, 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the 
War of the Rebellion, U.S. War Department (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 2nd ser., III, 1213.
47Stephen R. Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 143.
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finance the war effort.48
McRae won the support of Charles K. Prolieu, the 
acting president of Fraser, Trenholm, and Company shortly 
after arriving in Liverpool. Prolieu agreed to finance the 
construction of eight blockade runners for the Confederacy. 
Four of these ships were constructed by Jones, Quiggin and 
Company. The remaining four ships were constructed by Laird 
and Sons. McRae also contracted with the renowned tobacco 
and banking house of London and Liverpool, John K. Gilliat 
and Company, for the construction of six additional blockade 
runners by the firm of Jones, Quiggin and Company.
Financial arrangements between the Confederate government 
and each of these British financiers were similar. Each 
house financed the construction of the blockade runners for 
the Confederacy. In return, these two firms would receive 
the proceeds of one-half of the cotton and tobacco which was 
brought through the blockade. Once the loans were paid off, 
the Confederacy would become the sole operator of the 
vessels. The Gilliat tobacco house paid for the 
construction of the following sidewheelers: the Rosine, the
Ruby, the Widgeon, the Curlew, the Snipe, and the Plover.
Jones, Quiggin and Company contracted to deliver 
these vessels to Gilliat and Company by December 1864; 
unfortunately for the Confederacy, these blockade runners
48Ibid. , 142-43.
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remained unfinished at the war's end.49
Confederate tobacco was simply not diplomatically 
enticing enough to elicit official recognition from either 
France or Great Britain. The Confederacy's attempt at "King 
Tobacco" diplomacy failed; neither France nor Great Britain 
extended political recognition to the Confederate States of 
America, and neither European power provided any military 
assistance to the Confederates. Conversely, neither Great 
Britain nor France actually received the tobacco they 
desired or felt entitled to during the war. The Rothschild 
tobacco, being private property, was eventually destroyed by 
retreating Confederate soldiers during the evacuation of 
Richmond on 2 April 1865.50 The 7,000 hogsheads of tobacco 
owned by the French Regie were finally removed from Richmond 
and shipped to Paris once the Union army had secured control 
of Richmond and the James River after the war.51
49Ibid.; see also Charles S. Davis, Colin McRae: 
Confederate Financial Agent (Tuscaloosa: Confederate
Publishing Company, Inc., 1961), 56-57.
50Case and Spencer, 542.
51Ibid., 544.
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CHAPTER 5
THE POSTBELLUM TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN THE SOUTH
Four years of war left the Confederacy in ruins; 
Southern cities, factories, and plantations were scenes of 
destruction. The Confederate States of America was no more. 
Its once-thriving tobacco industry had almost disappeared in 
the wake of war. The Southern tobacco industry would be 
dormant until the end of Reconstruction. Tobacco had been a 
useful and powerful economic weapon during the war.
Tobacco, however, failed to attract the diplomatic and 
economic attention from Europe that the Confederacy thought 
it would.
The statistical figures cited by the agricultural 
reports of the seventh, eighth, and ninth United States 
Census document the rise and decline of the Southern tobacco 
industry between 1850 and 1870.
In 1850, Virginia produced 56,803,227 pounds of the 
nation's total production of 199,735,993 pounds of tobacco. 
Roughly one quarter of the nation's tobacco was produced in 
Virginia; it had a value of $5,157,652. Between 1850 and 
1860, individual manufacturers in Richmond, Lynchburg, and 
Danville became more productive. In 1850 there were twenty- 
three manufacturers among the three cities who produced more
88
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than $50,000 worth of tobacco. In 1860, forty-three 
manufacturers produced this product value. Virginia had a 
bumper crop of tobacco in 1860. It produced 123,968,312 
pounds of the article worth $12,236,683. The Old Dominion 
produced over one-third of the nation's 434,183,561 pounds 
of tobacco. The statistics from the census of 1870 bear out 
the devastating effect that the war had upon the tobacco 
industry of Virginia. Virginia's tobacco production of 1870 
was 37,086,364 pounds, well below its production level of 
1850. Virginia produced less than ten percent of the 
nation's 262,735,341 pounds of tobacco in 1870. This 
productivity yielded $7,054,770 of the nation's $71,762,044 
total tobacco revenue, less than ten percent.
The same statistical trends apply to the four major 
tobacco manufacturing cities of Virginia between 1850 and 
1870. Richmond, Danville, Petersburg, and Lynchburg showed 
significant gains in hands employed, capital investment, 
number of establishments, and annual product value between 
1850 and 1860. The statistical data from the census of 1870 
reveal a dramatic decline in tobacco production in each of 
these cities.
Less than one month after the Confederate surrender 
at Appomattox, T.C. Williams, a successful tobacco 
manufacturer from Richmond, described conditions he observed 
to his close friend and business associate, tobacco magnate 
James Thomas, Jr.:
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The loss of property, etc. and the destitution that 
must prevail is very great and it will be a long 
time if ever before the city and people will recover 
from it. Your losses though immense are not as 
great as many others, as they lost all. As things 
have turned out, you were fortunate.1
The former Confederacy was now a defeated and occupied
nation. Union soldiers roamed freely over the once
productive Confederate countryside. Helplessness, doubt,
and confusion engulfed the sentiments of the Southern
people. Tobacco planters and manufacturers reflected these
same emotions. Many formerly successful tobacco men now
feared that what little they had left might be confiscated
or heavily taxed by Federal authorities.2 Some even
guestioned whether to attempt to raise a tobacco crop at all
"as the foraging parties were going out and taking
everything."3 At war's end, future tobacco magnates such as
Washington Duke were virtually penniless. After being
released from a Federal prisoner-of-war camp in New Bern,
North Carolina, Duke walked the 134 miles to his tobacco
farm near Durham with only a silver fifty-cent piece in his
pocket. Before the war, he had anticipated that tobacco
would be a leading staple in the country. The large
quantity of tobacco that he had safely stored on his farm
!T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 2 May 
1865, Thomas Papers.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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was nearly gone when he arrived home. His tobacco had been 
"pressed” into service by the Union armies of General W.T. 
Sherman, and had been distributed all over the Union. To 
make matters worse, his home and tobacco barns were 
destroyed. "What was then considered a calamity by Duke and 
others who lost tobacco, ultimately proved to be a great 
blessing."4 Duke's story was similar to those of many 
tobacconists throughout Virginia and North Carolina after 
the war.
The future that faced tobacconists of the former 
Confederacy was one filled with the dread of uncertainty. 
"The presence of so many soldiers and the constant fear we 
are in prevents our having any fixed plans."5 Tobacco 
planters, dealers, and merchants found themselves totally at 
the mercy of the Federal army. Questions regarding tobacco 
taxes and prices were a serious preoccupation among Southern 
tobacconists. Yankee legal tender was nearly nonexistent in 
the hands of most Southerners. In another letter to James 
Thomas, Jr., in early May, Thomas C. Williams remarked that, 
"from the day of the evacuation of Richmond I have been 
anxious to sell out everything for gold, but there is no 
earthly prospect of doing anything of the kind here. The
4Hiram Paul, History of the Town of Durham, N.C. 
(Raleigh: Edwards, Broughton and Co., 1884), 150-52.
5T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 8 May 
1865, Thomas Papers.
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money must come from abroad as there is none here."6
The prospects of tobacco confiscation and heavy 
taxation by Federal authorities were only two problems which 
Southern tobacconists faced. Planters were also hard- 
pressed to find enough field hands to plant, cultivate, and 
harvest the tobacco crop. The skilled and slave labor that 
was formerly required in the tobacco cultivation and curing 
processes was no longer available. In the antebellum days, 
slaves performed most of the arduous tasks that were 
painstakingly executed in order to produce a top-quality 
tobacco product. Former slaves left their masters and 
migrated north in search of the promises of good fortune and
freedom. Over 200,000 slaves were freed in Southside
Virginia alone immediately after the war in 1865. This
created an immense vacuum in the labor force of Virginia's 
postbellum tobacco industry.7 Hired hands had all but 
melted away as the Army of Northern Virginia absorbed the 
few able-bodied men that were available in the closing 
months of the war. Tobacco planters were forced to split up 
their immense plantations into smaller, less labor-intensive 
sections. Freedmen entered into conventions of labor with 
former plantation owners and overseers. Land owners leased
6Ibid.
Catherine S. Perry, History of Farm Tenancy in the 
Tobacco Region of Virginia, 1865-1950 (Cambridge: Radcliffe
College Press, 1956), 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
their tobacco-producing acreage to tenant farmers, or made 
compensatory arrangements with sharecropper farmers.8
Tobacco planters complained that the "Yankees" stole 
everything from mules to fence rails;9 barns that had been 
destroyed had to be rebuilt. Vacant or inoperative tobacco 
factories that were still standing had to be guarded by 
their owners to prevent further destruction to them.10
In some cases the "Yankees" would indeed confiscate 
the tobacco of former Confederates and send it north as a 
prize or "tithe" of occupation.11 As the realities of defeat 
settled upon the South, another compelling obligation 
confronted the tobacconists of the former Confederacy—the 
loyalty oath and the oath of amnesty. Under the provisions 
of Reconstruction, Federal authorities required that 
individuals who formerly supported or sympathized with the 
Confederacy take oaths of repentance and loyalty. This 
Federal order affected the hired hand and entrepreneur 
alike.12 The consensus among the tobacconists of the former 
Confederacy was that the "voluntary" oath of amnesty and
8Ibid., 31-62.
9T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 12 May 
1865, Thomas Papers.
10Ibid.
UT.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 14 May 
1865, ibid.
12Levi Holbrook to Andrew Johnson, Danville, 3 June 
1865, Sutherlin Papers.
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loyalty was actually an act of necessity if one wished to 
protect what few possessions one still had left after the 
war. For stubborn tobacconists, a refusal to take "the 
oath" was to risk an automatic forfeiture of any remaining 
capital assets.13 Radical Republicans in Congress insisted 
that former Confederates or even former Confederate 
sympathizers "pay" for the damages that the Civil War 
created. The predominant sentiment in Congress at this time 
was that the former Confederacy should be punished for 
seceding from the Union, and for embracing the repugnant 
practice of slavery.
Social and political turmoil in the South continued 
to hamper the recovery of the tobacco trade during the later 
months of 1865. Tobacconists frequently complained about 
the expensive freight charges ($2 to $3 per hogshead) that 
they were expected to pay in transporting their tobacco to 
market.14 Planters employed workers under labor agreements 
which obligated the tobacco hands "by the month, some until 
Christmas, and some for the next year."15 Once hired hands 
were secured, the postbellum tobacco planter could harvest 
what meager quantities of tobacco he had available. The
13T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 9 June 
18 65, Thomas Papers.
I4T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 12 June 
1865, ibid.
I5Bird L. Ferrell to P.W. Ferrell, Richmond, 23 
November 1865, Sutherlin Papers.
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planter who succeeded in conducting a tobacco harvest that 
was even remotely fruitful was still subject to political 
developments from Washington. In January 1866, one 
particular Southern planter was advised to have all of his 
tobacco "inspected and branded at once. The radicals think 
the Southern people have received too many favors already."16
Commercial progress began to take place in the 
tobacco manufacturing centers of Virginia and North Carolina 
in 1866. Mechanization revolutionized the tobacco 
manufacturing procedure. Outing and pressing machines 
increased the productivity of manufactured tobacco 
significantly.17 New fertilizers were developed; George P. 
Kane, co-owner of the Roanoke Tobacco Company (Danville, 
Virginia) developed a fertilizer which consisted of ground 
bone dust and tobacco dust. This fertilizer was much more 
cost-effective than guano, which was used extensively before 
the war.18 Tobacco's place in society changed after the war 
as its consumption became more widespread. Tobacco came 
into use in other surprising roles.
Leaf tobacco was used as poultices on human beings
16Frick and Ball to Finney, Carter, and Muse, 
Baltimore, 20 January 1866, ibid.
17George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 13 July 
1866, the Charles Macgill Papers, Special Collections, 
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C. (hereafter 
referred to as Macgill Papers).
18George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 23 June 
1866, ibid.
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and as a raw material for insecticides to kill 
vermin on dogs and cats. Tobacco smoke was used in 
greenhouses to kill pests. Stems were used as 
fertilizer and brews made from tobacco were used to 
destroy grubs on fruit trees and ticks on sheep.19
In an effort to raise capital for insurance and 
investment, some postbellum tobacconists offered stock and 
an interest in their machinery in exchange for capital 
investment.20 With little or no American currency 
circulating in the South, tobacco manufacturers were 
sometimes forced to lay off employees at their factories.
Low sales and the absence of investors both contributed to 
the plight of postbellum tobacconists as well.21
Tobacco manufacturers attempted to revitalize their 
pre-war tobacco accounts with dealers in the North and in 
Europe. In late 1866, tobacco price currents published by 
the Tobacco Exchange in both Richmond and Petersburg 
indicated that modest quantities of the article were being 
prized (packaged), inspected, and shipped via the James 
River to New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and London.22
19Barbara Napier Bennett, W.T. Sutherlin and the 
Danville Tobacco Industry (Greensboro: University of North
Carolina Press, 1974), 71-72.
20George P. Kane to Charles T. Montagne, Danville, 17 
July 1866, Macgill Papers.
21George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 25 
August 1866, ibid.
21Richmond Price Current, Richmond, Virginia, 1 August 
1867, vol. 1, no. 7. Price currents which were published in 
Richmond, Petersburg, and Lynchburg at regular intervals 
between 1866 and 1872 reveal that the Virginia tobacco
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Tobacco prices fluctuated from 1866 to the early 1870s. 
Manufactured tobacco was priced by the pound. Leaf tobacco 
was priced in five-hundred-pound quantities. The grade or 
quality of the manufactured or leaf tobacco determined its 
market value. Among the many grades assigned to tobacco at 
this time were: common, fair, good shipping, common bright,
medium bright, good bright, fine bright, fine English 
shipping, and extra fancy. Common leaf tobacco commanded a 
price of $10 to $12 per five hundred pounds. The extra­
fancy grade of leaf was worth anywhere from $75 to $100 per 
five hundred pounds. The prices for manufactured tobacco 
ranged from $.14 to $.38 per pound at this time.23
The revenue tax placed upon Southern tobacco (five to 
thirty-five cents per pound) put some small tobacco 
manufacturers in danger of financial ruin.24 One enraged 
tobacconist, George P. Kane of Danville, spoke for many in 
the Southern postbellum tobacco community by exclaiming that 
"the idea of people paying such taxes for such government as 
we have is about the greatest absurdity imaginable. I feel 
it the subjugation of our people. Not a pound of tobacco
industry was slow to regain the vigor of its antebellum 
trade with domestic and foreign markets. For postbellum 
statistics on British tobacco importation, please see 
Appendix 4.
23Richmond Price Current, Richmond, Virginia, 12 
September 1867, vol. 1, no. 13.
24George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 28 July 
1866, Macgill Papers.
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can we send from the mill as at present.”25 As 1866 came to 
a close, tobacconists faced major questions as to whether to 
sell or hold their tobacco stock in light of the perplexing 
economic restrictions of the times.26
Tobacco company employees, investors, and 
stockholders were all at the mercy of the waning public 
demand for the article in early 1867. Executives who ran 
tobacco factories were frequently unable to draw salaries 
due to a lack of company capital.27 High taxes and the 
shortage of capital investment forced tobacco manufacturers 
to raise dramatically the prices of their tobacco products. 
Other expenses continued to cut into the capital outlay of 
struggling postbellum tobacconists. Appropriate packaging 
and marketing strategies for the tobacco leaf required large 
sums of money; some in the business were faced with the 
prospect of securing high-interest loans in order to make 
ends meet.28
By late 1867, these hardships began to drive some 
tobacco manufacturers of the Old South out of business.
25George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 14 July 
1866, ibid.
26George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 21 
December 1866, ibid.
27George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 21 
January 1867, ibid.
28George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 28 
September 1867, ibid.
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Many formerly prosperous manufacturers and dealers were on 
the brink of bankruptcy. George P. Kane, president of the 
Roanoke Tobacco Co. of Danville, reported to Dr. Charles 
Macgill, the chief stockholder of the company, "I have 
toiled and written all over the country, but I know and knew 
from the start that the only way to sell [tobacco] is for an 
owner to travel all the time.”29 Apprehensive manufacturers 
of limited financial means commented on "how terribly gloomy 
business looks all over the land"30 and that "great anxiety 
on the minds of all businessmen here prevails on the minds 
of all here."31 In May 1868, George P. Kane remarked that 
the continuation of these extenuating economic difficulties 
would "end every factory in the South, except perhaps some 
few, who have the money, like James Thomas, Jr."32
Many tobacconists throughout the former Confederacy 
continued to reel into insolvency in 1868 and 1869.
"Business continued to be depressed as well as spirits."33 
The grim provisions of Radical Reconstruction had a
29George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 18 
October 1867, ibid.
30George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 25 
February 1868, ibid.
31William Barrett to William J. Pendleton, Richmond, 13 
March 1868, Pendleton Papers.
32George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 29 May 
1868, Macgill Papers.
33William Barrett to Madison Pendleton, Richmond, 4 
February 1869, Pendleton Papers.
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suffocating effect on even the most financially secure 
planters and manufacturers of tobacco. The devastating 
effects of war and Reconstruction were too great for the 
Southern tobacco industry to immediately recover from. It 
would take the tobacco business another ten years following 
the end of Reconstruction in Virginia to slowly return to 
its former level of economic and commercial importance in 
the South.34
In I860, at least six of ten large manufacturers 
surveyed in Richmond had a capital value exceeding $150,000. 
The four "smaller" tobacco firms had a capital value which 
exceeded $30,000. The tobacco manufacturing firms of 
Patterson and Williams, Turpin and Yarbrough, R.A. Mayo, and 
W.R. Robinson all were worth in excess of $30,000 in 1860. 
The capital value of the larger manufacturers was 
impressive. Thomas and Samuel Hardgrove and the firm of 
W.H. Grant were each worth at least $150,000 each. J.H. 
Grant's enterprise was valued at between $400,000 and 
$500,000. D.B. and N.W. Harris were worth $500,000. The 
two largest tobacco manufacturers in Richmond, James Thomas, 
Jr. and William Barrett were each worth over $600,000 in
^Please refer to Appendix 14 on page 131 and Appendix 
15 on page 132. These statistics reflect the reduction in 
tobacco production in Virginia during the postbellum period 
of 1865 to 1870.
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The fortunes of these manufacturers changed 
significantly because of the war. Five of the ten 
manufacturers surveyed in 1860 were out of business after 
1865. The tobacco firm of D.B. and N.W. Harris was 
destroyed in a cavalry raid by General Philip Sheridan in 
1864. The five firms which survived the war enjoyed varying 
degrees of prosperity after 1867. By 1867, James Thomas,
Jr. was again worth $500,000, regaining the prosperity he 
enjoyed before the war. By 1868, Turpin and Yarbrough had 
also restored prosperity to their enterprises. William 
Barrett was perhaps the most resilient and prosperous of the 
tobacco manufacturers of the immediate postbellum period.
He was worth nearly $1,000,000 in 1868. R.A. Patterson, a 
nephew of James Thomas, Jr., and his partner, Thomas C. 
Williams, achieved a capital value of $800,000 by 1870. 
Williams became the personal attorney for James Thomas, Jr. 
after the war. Their relationship extended beyond 
friendship into business. Patterson and Williams continued 
to enjoy the advice and financial support of James Thomas, 
Jr. until his death at the age of seventy-six in 1882. 
Patterson and Williams continued to prosper in the tobacco
35A11 of the financial citations referred to above were 
taken from the R.G. Dun and Co. Collection, Special 
Collections, Baker Library, Graduate School of Business 
Administration, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, 
1849-1890. All individual citations are listed in Appendix 
1 on page 113.
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manufacturing business well into the 1880s.36
The southern tobacco industry continued to re-emerge 
and grow in the 1870s. It developed gradually into a 
modern, thriving economic giant. Ironically, the war 
provided a stimulus to the production of tobacco in the late 
1870s by introducing soldiers of the Union and Confederate 
armies to the weed. "Chewing was no longer accepted in many 
social circles, but hand-rolled cigarettes became very 
popular since they were no longer considered to be 
effeminate."37 James Bonsack's invention of the cigarette 
manufacturing machine revolutionized the southern tobacco 
industry forever. "In 1876, his machine-made cigarettes 
were introduced at the Philadelphia Exposition.1,38 Hand- 
rolled cigarettes became a thing of the past as a result of 
Bonsack's invention. "A rapid cigarette-maker, by hand, 
could make 2,500 a day. In only ten hours, the Bonsack 
machine could produce 120,000 cigarettes, the equivalent of 
a day's work for forty-eight laborers I"39 The tobacco firm 
of Allen and Ginter was the first company in Richmond to 
employ the Bonsack machine; Washington Duke and Sons, Co. 
was the first company in North Carolina to do so. Duke's
36Ibid.
37Bennett, 71.
38Ibid.
39Paul, 208.
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American Tobacco Company emerged in the mid-1880s as one of 
the most productive and prosperous tobacco manufacturers in 
America.40 By 1883, Duke was manufacturing 250,000 
cigarettes a day, and was exporting tobacco not only all 
over the country, but to sixteen foreign countries as well.41 
After being nearly destroyed by the Civil War, the tobacco 
industry of the former Confederacy inevitably surpassed its 
accomplishments of the antebellum period.
The Confederate policy of "King Tobacco" diplomacy 
failed for several important reasons. The Confederacy 
mismanaged the potential economic and political value of 
tobacco. Confederate policy was inevitably far more 
detrimental than war to the economic and political potential 
that tobacco presented to the interests of the Confederate 
States of America. Confederate tobacco policy was 
inconsistent, contradictory, and misconstrued by 
legislators. Poorly-designed tax policy and harmful 
legislation prevented tobacco from becoming the valuable 
asset the Confederacy had hoped it would be. Four of the 
five factors which contributed to the eventual paralysis of 
the Confederacy's domestic tobacco trade were byproducts of 
war:
• the commercial chaos which gripped the industry
40Ibid.
41Ibid. , 111-12.
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immediately after the Confederate attack on Fort 
Sumter;
• transportation and communications disruptions;
• the capture or destruction of tobacco by Federal 
armies; and
• impressment of tobacco and capital by Federal 
armies.
Yet, it was the Confederacy itself that had the most 
damaging influence on its domestic tobacco trade. 
Inappropriate policies regarding tobacco taxation and 
legislation were far more harmful to the well-being of its 
tobacco industry than the war was.
Confederate interests in the international tobacco 
trade were undermined by two principal factors:
• the successful implementation of the Federal 
blockade of Southern ports from the Potomac to the 
Rio Grande; and
• the emergence of alternative sources of tobacco in 
Europe.
Although some Confederate tobacco did break through the 
blockade via foreign vessels and Confederate blockade 
runners, the flow of tobacco from southern ports to European 
customers was progressively snuffed out between May 18 61 and 
December 1863. As a result, European consumers began to 
patronize other countries for a steady and reliable source 
of tobacco. By 1863, the Confederate international tobacco
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trade was essentially neutralized by the Federal blockade 
and by the competition of foreign tobacco-producing nations.
Diplomatically, tobacco was used as a bargaining chip 
by the Confederacy in an effort to gain independent status 
and official political recognition from the world's greatest 
economic and military powers, Great Britain and France.
Over the course of the war, tobacco played a primary role in 
several international diplomatic crises:
• the Hiawatha and Tropic Wind incidents;
• the Trent affair;
• the Franco-Confederate attempt to ship French- 
owned tobacco from Richmond through the blockade.
In each case, tobacco (or the promise of tobacco) failed to 
bring the Confederacy the military assistance and diplomatic 
recognition it so desperately desired. Tobacco was simply 
not diplomatically enticing enough to the French or British 
to risk war with the United States.
Statistics compiled in the census of 1860 bear 
witness to the fact that the southern antebellum tobacco 
industry had no global rival immediately before the Civil 
War. Only cotton was more economically profitable and 
politically valuable than tobacco to the South in 1861. The 
tobacco statistics reported in the census of 1870 
demonstrate the devastating impact that the war had on the 
Confederate tobacco industry. Production capital value 
figures of the postwar years reveal why it took nearly
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fifteen years for the southern tobacco trade to re-emerge as 
an eminent economic industry. By all accounts, tobacco 
played a vital role in the interests of the South from 1850 
to 1880; it was second in economic and political importance 
only to cotton during the Confederate era.
Historians have thoroughly examined the political and 
economic role that cotton played in southern affairs during 
the Confederate era. No study has been conducted which 
examines the valuable role that tobacco played in southern 
commerce and diplomacy from 1850 to 1880. Research that has 
been done in regard to tobacco and Confederate policy is 
nearly nonexistent due to the absence of statistical data 
from 1861 to 1865.
Joseph C. Robert's The Tobacco Kingdom is a well- 
documented study of the history of tobacco production in 
Virginia from 1800 to 1860. Robert relies mainly upon the 
statistical data found in the census reports of this period 
in his text. He also does an admirable job of providing 
biographical profiles of tobacco planters and manufacturers. 
The major shortcoming of Robert's work is his failure to 
address the role that tobacco played in Confederate affairs 
from 1861 to 1865. Robert fails to address the role that 
tobacco played in Confederate domestic policy, foreign 
trade, and foreign diplomacy. He also fails to mention the 
rise of the southern tobacco industry in the postbellum era.
B.W. Arnold's History of the Tobacco Industry in
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Virginia from 1860 to 1894 is almost entirely dependent upon 
the census returns of 1860, 1870, 1880, and 1890. His text 
is relatively short; his narration simply ties his 
statistical citations together. Again, Arnold makes no 
mention whatsoever of tobacco and its role in Confederate 
affairs during the war.
Barbara N. Bennett and Katherine S. Perry have each 
written monographs which discuss the southern tobacco 
industry in the postbellum period. Bennett's William T. 
Sutherlin and the Danville Tobacco Industry discusses the 
influence that Sutherlin had on the tobacco trade of 
Pittsylvania County, Virginia, from 1867 to 1894. Perry's 
History of Farm Tenancy in the Tobacco Region of Virginia 
describes the rise of tenant farming and sharecropping in 
the tobacco belt of Virginia from 1865 to 1950.
Several authors have written articles or done brief 
studies of specific cases involving tobacco and Confederate 
affairs. Warren F. Spencer's "French Tobacco in Richmond" 
is an excellent, detailed account of the most important 
tobacco-related diplomatic affair of the Civil War.
Mountague Bernard briefly examines a tobacco-related subject 
in his book, A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great 
Britain during the American Civil War. Bernard explores the 
arena of international law as it applied to Federal prize 
court cases which involved the detention of tobacco-laden 
ships of foreign registry.
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None of the authors mentioned above addresses the 
vital issues which involved tobacco and Confederate policy. 
Monographs and articles which do investigate the southern 
tobacco industry fail to examine the article at its most 
critical moment in southern history: the American Civil
War. Warren F. Spencer, Bingham Duncan, Frank L. Olmstead, 
and M.L. Bonham, Jr. have all published valuable articles 
which shed some light on the role that tobacco played in the 
South during the Confederate era.
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APPENDIX 1
THE CAPITAL WORTH OF VIRGINIA TOBACCO
MANUFACTURERS (in dollars)
TOBACCONIST1 CITY 1849-1850 1858-1859 POST-1865
Thomas and Samuel 
Hardgrove2
Richmond $30,000-
40,000
$150,000-
200,000
Out of Business
James Thomas, Jr.3 Richmond $40,000-
50,000
$500,000-
600,000
$400,000- 
500,000 in 18674
J.H. Grant5 Richmond $25,000 $400,000-
500,000
Out of Business
Turpin and 
Yarbrough6
Richmond Not
available
$40,000-
50,000
$40,000-50,000 
in 1868
W.H. Grant7 Richmond $75,000-
100,000
$150,000-
200,000
Out of Business
William Barrett8 Richmond $30,000-
40,000
$600,000-
700,000
$500,000- 
1,000,000 1868
R.A. Mayo9 Richmond Not
available
$50,000-
60,000
Out of Business
R.A. Patterson and 
T.C. Williams'0
Richmond Not in 
Business
$25,000-
30,000
$800,000 in 
1870"
W.R. Robinson'2 Richmond $40,000 in 
1855
$50,000-
60,000
Out of Business
D.B. and N.W. 
Harris'3
Louisa Co. Not
available
$500,000 Business 
destroyed by 
Sheridan in 
1864
James Fisher14 Manchester $15,000-
20,000
Failed in 
1858
—
'All of the citations below were taken from R.G. Dun and Co. 
Collection, Special Collections, Baker Library, Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts.
2Va. vol. 43, 48.
3Ibid., 87.
“Ibid., 44, 224.
5Ibid., 43, 102.
6Ibid., 103.
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7Ibid., 103. 
8Ibid., 104. 
’Ibid., 244. 
l0Ibid., 372.
Ibid., 44, 224
Ibid., 43, 243
Ibid., 24, 286
'“Ibid., 43, 87.
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APPENDIX 2
ANTEBELLUM TOBACCONISTS
Among the many national tobacconists of the 1850s were the 
following. They are organized by geographic region (North, 
Deep South, West) and by city (Boston, New York, Baltimore, 
etc.) (compiled from James Thomas letters and other 
sources). This list is limited to those tobacconists cited 
in Chapter 2.
Northern Firms
Boston
Portland 
New York
Philadelphia
Baltimore
Cincinnati
Chillicothe
Southern Firms
Richmond
Danville
W.H. Wilkinson 
G. W. Abbott 
Fisher and Co.
J.H. and S.G. Thayer 
(Maine) J.B. Carroll
William H. Price 
Charles M. Connolly 
Ludlam and Heineken 
J.A. and T.A. Patterson 
J.R .S. Pendleton 
G.W. Hillman and Co. 
Bucknor and McCammon 
Motzer and Brehm 
James Wilson 
Jacob Heald 
Thomas B. Skinner 
Claiborne, Ferguson and Co. 
Kennett, Dudley and Co. 
(Ohio) Samuel T. DeFan
Fredericksburg 
Whillacke (N.C.) 
Cedar Grove (N.C 
New Orleans
Morton Armstead 
J.H. Motley
D.T. Williams 
Dean, Brown, and Co. 
George W. Allen
E.J. Collier 
R.A. Miles 
Hill and Warren 
Thomas E. Barksdale
) Thomas W. Lindsey 
J.C. Glenn and Co. 
Wills and Rawlins
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Southern Firms (cont'd).
(New Orleans)
Charleston
Mobile
Portsmouth (Va.) 
Jackson (Miss.) 
Oglethorpe (Ga.)
Western Firms
San Francisco 
St. Louis
Louisville
Chicago
Van Benthuysen and Crofton
J.T. Doswell
Adams Frost and Co.
Robert T . Dade 
Buskirk and Davis and Co. 
Fears and Putnam 
John W. Babb
J.H. Coghill 
A.J. Seemullen 
Thomas Mullin 
John Ward
G. Frankenthal
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APPENDIX 3
FOREIGN TOBACCO DEALERS
Nearly a dozen foreign tobacco dealers were in constant 
communication with the most prominent tobacco planters and 
manufacturers of the Richmond area throughout the 1850s. 
These dealers continued to do business with Southern tobacco 
concerns throughout the war despite the limitations of 
inflation, market fluctuation, communication, and the 
Federal naval blockade of Confederate ports. The following 
firms were the most important foreign tobacco companies 
involved in the international tobacco trade immediately 
before and during the American Civil War. Please refer to 
footnoted citations in the text for additional foreign 
tobacco firms which patronized Confederate tobacconists 
during the war.
Mailler, Lord, and Quereau of Melbourne and Adelaide 
William Oxley and Son of Liverpool 
D. McPherson and Co. of Melbourne and Sydney 
Greene, Heath, and Allen of Melbourne and San 
Francisco
John K. Gilliat and Co. of London and Liverpool
H.H. Meier and Co. of Bremen
Fisher, Ricards, and Co. of Melbourne and New York
D.H. Watjen and Co. of Bremen
Boninger, Kramer and Co. of Bremen
Mees and Moens of Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Robert Edwards of London and Liverpool
Robert Somervail of Liverpool
G.F. Davis and Co. of London
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APPENDIX 4
VALUE OF TOBACCO IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM
(1855-1870)
YEAR
VALUE 
(IN £000,000)
1855 1.6
1856 2.2
1857 2.2
1858 2.5
1859 1.8
1860 1.8
1861 2.2
1862 2.4
1863 3.0
1864 3.4
1865 3.3
1866 2.6
1867 2.4
1868 2.3
1869 2.3
1870 2.4
Source: B.R. Mitchell, 
Statistics (Cambridge:
Abstract of British Historical 
University Press, 1962), 298.
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APPENDIX 5
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF RICHMOND IN 1850
NAME OF TOBACCONIST
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO 
PRODUCED (in pounds)
VALUE (in 
dollars)
James Thomas, Jr. 600,000 120,000
Poiteaux Robinson 1,000,000 150,000
J.L. Liggons 250,000 62,500
J.J. Goode 300,000 75,000
B.L. Turpin 166,000 26,000
R.A. Mayo 270,000 45,000
W.R. Myers 1,000,00C 350,000
Hoorich and Bro. 201,189 43,000
George Mills 613,963 95,000
James Fisher 300,000 42,000
L.L. Saunders 275,000 38,500
Gilliam and Matthews 630,000 80,000
John Enders 500,000 90,000
Turpin and Yarbrough 300,000 54,000
N.B. Hill and Co. 250,000 45,000
William Barrett 400,000 100,000
P.B. Harwood 225,000 37,000
R.D. Christian 160,000 28,900
William Graner and Son 600,000 108,000
Thomas and Samuel 
Hardgrove
900,000 225,000
J.H. Grant 1,320,000 198,000
E.A. Smith 235,000 33,750
W.H. Grant 600,000 85,000
C.P. Wood 200,000 30,000
Source: U.S. Census, 1850: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Henrico Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1853).
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APPENDIX 6
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF LYNCHBURG IN 1850
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO VALUE (in 
NAME OF TOBACCONIST________PRODUCED (in pounds) dollars)
Granville Jordan 40,000 8 000
Norwich and Otey 157,000 30 000
James Saunders 300,000 50 000
McCorkle and Simpson 150,000 30 000
J.L. Clayton 190,000 33 000
J.L. Brown — 20 000
M. Langhorne and Sons 320,000 75 000
J.P. Knight 100,000 15 000
Tyler and Anderson 100,000 20 000
Halsey and Crenshaw 200,000 20 000
Augustus Leftwich 140,000 30 000
N .S. Loyd 120,000 25 000
John Boisseau 220,000 45 000
Scholfield and Lewis 100,000 20 000
W.L. Saunders 120,000 40 000
William Crompton 220,000 50 000
W.P. Allison 150,000 30 000
W.H. Langhorne and Co. 120,000 18 000
Roberts and Sisson 110,000 18 000
T.P. Nash 200,000 40 000
Seldon and Anthony 200,000 40 000
Buston and Mayo 200,000 45 000
G.W. Warwick 100,000 20 000
Cabaniss and Armistead 130,000 20 000
A.H. Armistead 300,000 60 000
W.D. Miller 110,000 22 000
Dudley and John 350,000 88 000
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NAME OF TOBACCONIST
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO 
PRODUCED (in pounds)
VALUE (in 
dollars)
E.T. Williams 180,000 28,000
A.B. Gaulett 15,000 3,000
John Rucker 200,000 25,000
Source: U.S. Census, 1850: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Campbell Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1853).
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APPENDIX 7
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF DANVILLE IN 1850
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO VALUE (in 
NAME OF TOBACCONIST_______ PRODUCED (in pounds) dollars)
W.H. and J.H. Payne 75,000 10 000
S.W. Lanier 40,000 4 000
Griggs and Garrant 42,000 4 500
Pritchill and Hutchinson 75,000 8 000
Kern and Watkins 75,000 8 000
Bartlett Joiner 53,000 7 500
Williams and Granley 50,000 8 000
J.A. May 50,000 5 000
Miller and Trotter 35,000 5 100
W.D. Williams 28,000 3 500
W.W. Kean 80,000 10 000
Wellington Witches 20,000 3 200
A. Barksdale 600,000 96 000
Miller and Tisler 150,000 20 000
Anderson and Co. 200,000 25 000
Wills and Anderson 500,000 60 000
Hebron Johns 750,000 90 000
Samuel Berger 30,000 6 700
John Swanson 32,500 7 875
Jones and Watkins 112,500 20 200
Joab Watson 12,000 1 500
William Ayers 200,000 33 000
Holing and Walk 350,000 45 000
Holland and Law 215,000 32 000
John W. Holland 90,892 14 500
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QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO VALUE (in
NAME OF TOBACCONIST PRODUCED (in pounds) dollars)
Laird Brown 275,000 33,000
W.T. Sutherlin 370,000 35,000
Source: U.S. Census, 1850: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Pittsylvania Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1853).
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APPENDIX 8
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF FARMVILLE IN 1850
NAME OF TOBACCONIST
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO 
PRODUCED (in pounds)
VALUE (in 
dollars)
J.W. Dunnington 300,000 20,000
Williams and Venable 100,000 6,000
George Daniel 225,000 26,500
Read and Carrington 80,000 15,000
C.C. Read 176,000 28,000
Source: U.S. Census, 1850: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Prince Edward Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1853).
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APPENDIX 9
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF RICHMOND IN 1860
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO VALUE (in 
NAME OF TOBACCONIST_______ PRODUCED (in pounds) dollars)
John W. Atkinson 450,000 90,000
Baker, Pleasants, and 
Frayser
64,466 22,485
Bond and Talbott 250,000 40,000
South and McCurdy 400,000 65,000
William Graner 700,000 140,000
Faunley and Walsh 154,000 29,500
John E. Whitlock 200,000 90,000
Jones and Thornton 387,905 65,945
Hunt and Hail 50,000 10,000
P.A. Blackborn 500,000 100,000
J .B . Legan 250,000 45,000
Christian and Sell 700,000 190,000
W.R. Robinson 390,400 80,500
Samuel Gaithwright 21,875 2,087
E.S. Turpin and Co. 475,000 70,000
C.E. Kent 500,000 98,000
J.H. Greanor 600,000 155,000
W.R. Grant 1,350,000 245,000
J .P . Royster 750,000 200,000
A.W. Taylor 300,000 50,000
Turpin and Yarbrough 700,000 175,000
Washington Ross 350,000 70,000
S.M. Bailey 500,000 115,000
W.J. Westscn 200,000 40,000
G.P. and J.H. Wood 536,961 100,000
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NAME OF TOBACCONIST
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO 
PRODUCED (in pounds)
VALUE (in 
dollars)
Coleman Wortham 436,000 100,000
Patterson and Williams 450,000 90,000
John F. Allen 200,000 60,000
Crew and Pemberton 550,000 90,000
Robert J. Higgins 250,000 42,500
W.A. Grant 500,000 140,000
William Garrett 590,000 105,200
R.M. Stevenson 350,000 50,000
A.R. Thomas 660,000 150,000
E.H. Simpson 35,000 2,800
Cosby and Anderson 500,000 100,000
Sydnor and Anderson 320,000 57,600
James Thomas, Jr. 1,100,000 225,000
T.L. Timberlake 200,000 36,000
J .H .F. Mayo 600,000 72,000
J.H. Gentry and Co. 500,000 125,000
James Downing 400,000 72,000
J.D. Harwood 450,000 100,000
R.A. Mayo 315,000 80,000
Thomas and Samuel 
Hardgrove
800,000 190,000
Roddy and Strother 500,000 75,000
J.D. Blair 250,000 32,000
Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Henrico Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 10
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF LYNCHBURG IN 1860
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO VALUE (in 
NAME OF TOBACCONIST_______ PRODUCED (in pounds) dollars)
Cabell and Whitehead 250,000 30,000
Augustine Leftwich 1,000,000 80,000
Jesse Kease 270,000 50,000
J.M. Becker 300,000 60,000
McCorkle and Co. 200,000 30,000
M. Langhorne and Son 360,000 80,000
A.A. Read and Son 192,000 40,000
Piedmont Factory 30,000 3,500
James Knight 200,000 23,895
John Knight 100,000 18,000
W.D. Miller 200,000 25,000
J.W. Carroll 123,000 35,000
C.D. Mafair 320,000 50,000
Woodroof Factory 300,000 50,000
Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Campbell Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 11 
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF DANVILLE IN 1860
NAME OF TOBACCONIST
QUANTITY OF 
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO 
PRODUCED (in pounds)
VALUE (in 
dollars)
Sutherlin and Ferrell 255,000 70,000
S.H. Holland 150,000 40,000
J.B. Pace 160,000 25,000
J.J. Hawkins 120,000 21,600
J.H. Pemberton 300,000 54,000
W.T. Sutherlin 435,000 97,732
G.W. Williams 600,000 20,000
J.R. Miller and Son 105,000 25,000
E.W. Dixon 57,000 10,500
J.H. Trotter 100,000 23,000
R. Williams 60,000 16,000
T .R . Trotter 97,500 24,000
J.W. Holland 270,000 68,000
Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Pittsylvania Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 12
RAW TOBACCO PRODUCTION IN THE SOUTHERN
STATES IN 1850 AND 1860 (in pounds)
1 8 5 0 1 8 6 0
Virginia 56,803,227 123,968,312
North Carolina 11,984,786 32,853,250
Tennessee 20,148,932 43,448,097
Missouri 17,113,784 25,086,196
Maryland 21,407,497 38,410,965
Kentucky 55,501,196 108,126,840
All Southern States 199,735,993 434,183,561
Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1863).
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX 13
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO PRODUCTION FOR VIRGINIA, 
THE SOUTHERN STATES, AND THE UNITED STATES 
IN 1850 AND 1860
VA
(1850)
USA
(1850)
VA
(1860)
SOUTHERN
STATES
(1860)
USA
(1860)
No. Establish­
ments
209 1,418 261 409 626
Capital Invest­
ment (in $)
1,412,471 5,008,295 3,856,990 5,475,938 9,484,988
Cost of Raw 
Tobacco (in $)
3,017,904 7,341,728 7,163,943 8,598,024 13,024,988
Male Hands 4,802 12,261 9,572 11,321 15,869
Female Hands 477 1,975 1,810 2,300 2,990
Annual Cost of 
Labor (in $)
597,240 2,420,208 2,123,732 2,425,040 3,571,294
Annual Value of 
Product (in $)
5,157,652 13,491,141 12,236,683 14,612,442 21,820,535
Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule, United
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1863) .
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APPENDIX 14
TOBACCO PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURERS IN
CAMPBELL, PITTSYLVANIA, HENRICO, DINWIDDIE
cOuNTIES IN 1860
CAMPBELL
COUNTY
PITTSYLVANIA
COUNTY
HENRICO
COUNTY
DINWIDDIE
COUNTY
No. Establish­
ments
47 39 52 20
Capital Invest­
ment (in $)
787,690 258,000 1,121,025 587,000
Cost of Raw 
Tobacco (ir. $)
1,197,437 767,071 2,882,415 1,056,170
Male Hands 1,310 829 3,370 1,676
Female Hands 279 220 34 840
Annual Cost of 
Labor (in $)
263,580 269,316 714,384 469,752
Annual Value of 
Product (in $)
2,081,149 1,031,544 4,838,995 2,167,202
Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule, United
States, Virginia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 15
TOBACCO MANUFACTURED IN LEADING COUNTIES IN VIRGINIA, 1870
COUNTY
NO. ES­
TABLISH­
MENTS
HANDS
EMPLOYED
CAPITAL 
(in $)
WAGES 
(in $)
MATERIALS 
(in $)
PRODUCT 
VALUE 
(in $)
Henrico 38 3,970 580,500 688,820 2,384,787 3,984,918
Dinwiddie 15 1,739 384,550 299,965 1,022,658 1,819,286
Pittsyl­
vania
8 601 70,800 52,600 245,836 456,631
Henry 4 147 73,000 10,680 62,505 131,000
Bedford 5 176 37,000 24,500 80,929 117,370
Chester­
field
2 97 32,000 24,850 58,888 104,771
Campbell Not Available
Source: U.S. Census, 1870: Manufacturing Schedule, United
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1872) .
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APPENDIX 16
POSTBELLUM TOBACCO PRODUCTION, 1870
USA VIRGINIA NORTH CAROLINA
Establishments 5,204 131 111
Steam Engines
Horsepower 2,688 239 -
Number 178 25 -
Water Wheels
Horsepower 402 60 -
Number 26 2 -
Hands Employed
Altogether 47,848 7,534 1,465
Males 16+ 31,997 4,365 763
Females 15+ 7,794 1,312 332
Youth 8,057 1,857 370
Capital (in $) 24,924,330 1,391,925 375,882
Wages (in $) 14,315,342 1,181,418 102,144
Material Used (in
S)
34,656,607 4,082,181 391,027
Tobacco Product 
Value (in $)
71,762,044 7,054,770 718,765
Source: U.S. Census, 1870: Manufacturing Schedule, United
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1872) .
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